Maude v. Barboza

Background

Erin K. Maude initially filed the action without a lawyer and later obtained counsel and filed a first amended complaint. She alleges that, in 2020, her children reported sexual abuse by their stepmother. Several mandatory reporters, including Ciro Barboza, a detective with the Salinas City Police Department, reported the allegations to Child Protective Services. The complaint alleges that CPS and the police investigated and concluded that the allegations were unfounded.

Maude alleges that on May 7, 2020, Barboza and CPS investigator Francis Magbag removed the children from her custody without prior notice and placed them with their father. She further alleges that the officials told local law enforcement the father had full custody, even though no custody order then granted him custody. A May 12, 2020, temporary custody order of the Superior Court of Monterey County gave the children’s father sole custody. Maude alleges that she was not given notice or an opportunity for a hearing concerning the custody of her children.

Maude brings one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, alleging that Barboza violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by removing the children without notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Barboza moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim.

Failure to State a Claim

Barboza argued that the amended complaint contradicted Maude’s original complaint, which had alleged that a state court held a custody hearing on May 10, 2020. The court acknowledged tension between the pleadings but accepted the amended complaint’s allegation that no hearing had occurred. The court relied on the principle that, absent bad faith, the Federal Rules generally allow successive pleadings to contain inconsistent allegations.

The court identified two possible bases for Maude’s due-process claim. First, she challenged the May 7 removal. Second, she challenged the state court’s later custody decisions. The court found that Maude had not alleged facts showing that Barboza was responsible for the state court’s custody determinations. The court therefore rejected the claim to the extent it was based on those determinations.

The court reached a different conclusion about the May 7 removal. Parents have a fundamental constitutional right to participate in the care, custody, and management of their children. Under the cited Ninth Circuit standard, officials may remove a child without prior judicial authorization only when the information available to them provides reasonable cause to believe the child faces imminent danger of serious bodily injury and the removal is reasonably necessary to prevent that danger.

Accepting Maude’s allegations as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court found that the complaint identified only CPS’s conclusion that the children had not received adequate psychiatric care for anxiety. The court stated that this alleged lack of care did not establish imminent danger of serious bodily injury or other imminent harm. It therefore denied the motion to dismiss on this ground.

Immunity

Barboza argued that absolute immunity protected him from the § 1983 claim. Absolute immunity is protection from liability for certain government functions. The court noted that Barboza cited authority involving social workers and did not explain why the alleged removal of the children by a police detective was a protected prosecutorial or advocacy function. The court held that Barboza was not entitled to absolute immunity on the record before it.

Barboza also invoked qualified immunity, which can protect government officials from litigation when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The court concluded that, accepting the complaint’s allegations, the alleged removal violated Maude’s due-process rights and that the relevant right had been clearly established for years. The court held that Barboza was not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage, while noting that he could raise the defense again at summary judgment after further factual development.

Disposition

The court denied Barboza’s motion to dismiss. It also stated that it could not order the Monterey Superior Court, which was not a party, to hold a custody hearing. The court terminated as moot an earlier report and recommendation that had recommended dismissing the case for failure to timely serve defendants.