Doe v. Becerra

Background

John Doe, who was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus—a request for a court order addressing allegedly unlawful detention. He had been detained for more than 22 months without an individualized determination of whether he was a flight risk or a danger to the community. He asked the court to release him or order a bond hearing at which the government would have to justify continued detention.

ICE initially treated Doe as subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because of a 2017 California assault conviction. While the petition was pending, an immigration judge issued a final removal order that also granted Doe protection under the Convention Against Torture. Doe remained detained, and the statutory basis for his detention changed to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).

Jurisdiction and the Change in Detention Statute

The government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction and that the case belonged in the Eastern District of California, where Doe had been detained when he filed the petition. The court rejected that argument, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent holding that district courts may hear immigration-detention challenges that are independent of the merits of a removal order. The court also found that the dispute remained live because Doe was still detained.

The court rejected the government’s argument that the change from Section 1226(c) to Section 1231(a) made the petition moot or changed the due-process analysis. The court stated that its conclusion was based on the length of Doe’s detention without a hearing, not on which detention statute applied. The final removal order did not erase the time Doe had already spent detained without a bond hearing.

Due Process Analysis

The court applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge. That test considers the person’s private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards, and the government’s interest.

The court found that Doe’s interest in freedom from detention weighed in his favor because he had been detained for more than 22 months without a bond hearing and there was no reasonably certain end to his detention. The grant of protection under the Convention Against Torture added uncertainty because the government could not simply remove him to Mexico.

The court also found that the risk of an unjustified deprivation of liberty and the value of a bond hearing weighed in Doe’s favor. Doe had never received a hearing focused on whether continued civil detention was necessary, and the government had not conducted particularized fact-finding about his flight risk or danger to the community.

The court found the government’s interest in denying Doe a bond hearing to be limited. It reasoned that requiring a hearing after more than 22 months would not meaningfully interfere with the government’s interest in detaining people who pose a flight risk or danger. The court therefore held that Doe’s continued detention without an individualized bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment’s due-process guarantee.

The court did not decide whether people detained under Section 1226(c) are automatically entitled to a bond hearing after six months. It also declined to decide Doe’s separate argument that his detention violated substantive due process because it was excessive and unnecessary, granting relief instead on his procedural due-process claim.

Burden of Proof and Order

The court held that the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is warranted by showing that Doe is a flight risk or a danger to the community. It ordered that the hearing be conducted by an immigration judge rather than by the court.

The court GRANTED Doe’s petition in part. It ordered the government to provide Doe with a constitutionally compliant bond hearing before an immigration judge within 14 days of the order. If the immigration judge did not issue a decision within 14 days after the hearing, Doe SHALL be released from detention. The court also ordered the respondents to file copies of any immigration-judge orders on the docket, under seal if necessary.