Martinez v. County of Alameda

Background

This tentative pretrial order addressed motions in limine, which are requests to limit evidence or testimony before trial, along with other trial-management issues. Martinez alleges that the County denied her requested scribe services at the County Clerk-Recorder’s Office on March 29, 2019. The opinion discusses claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act concerning effective communication, auxiliary aids or services, and declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.

County’s Motions in Limine

The court denied the County’s Motion in Limine No. 1 without prejudice. The motion sought to exclude evidence that other public entities had provided scribe services. The court found that evidence relevant to whether scribe services were effective and whether they were a reasonable accommodation, while allowing the County to raise objections about prejudice, speculation, hearsay, or foundation at trial.

The court denied the County’s Motion in Limine No. 2 without prejudice. The motion sought to exclude evidence about other people’s experiences with the County or other public entities. The court found relevant the proposed testimony of Marco Salsiccia and Lucia Greco about receiving scribe services at the same office, and Raymond Macapagal’s anticipated testimony about using the County’s computer kiosk and screen reader. The court also stated that trial objections could be raised if particular testimony created prejudice, confusion, or other evidentiary problems.

The court granted in part and denied in part the County’s Motion in Limine No. 3, which challenged testimony from Martinez’s experts Steven Clark, Karen McCall, and Eve Hill.

For Clark, the court granted the motion as to opinions that the County’s form was not accessible under any professional standard or was not accessible regardless of the screen reader or PDF viewer used. The court treated those opinions as legal conclusions. The court denied the motion as to Clark’s other identified opinions, including testimony about whether a blind person could independently complete the form, the time and complexity of using the electronic form, and the comparative speed and complexity of using scribe services. The court also denied the challenge based on alleged lack of expertise and denied the request to exclude the testimony as cumulative, while allowing objections to unnecessarily cumulative testimony at trial.

For McCall, the court granted the motion as to opinions that the four forms were not accessible under any professional standard and that two versions represented a degradation in accessibility compared with an earlier version, because those opinions could amount to legal conclusions. McCall could compare the forms and discuss alleged problems and whether they persisted, so long as her testimony did not include legal conclusions about accessibility. The court denied the motion as to her opinion that the forms could not be independently completed by a blind person using screen-reader technology and as to her identification of problems with the forms and whether those problems continued.

For Hill, the court denied the motion as to her opinion that the County’s expert, Cris Vaughan, was not an expert in whether auxiliary aids effectively provide equal communication to consumers with disabilities. It also denied the motion as to Hill’s opinion that a scribe is a common auxiliary aid provided by public entities to communicate effectively with blind people. The court granted the motion as to Hill’s opinions about whether the aids offered to Martinez in 2019, or offered by the County later, were equally effective to the requested scribe services, treating those opinions as legal conclusions about ultimate factual issues.

Martinez’s Motions in Limine

The court granted Martinez’s Motion in Limine No. 1. The County was not asserting an undue-burden or fundamental-alteration defense. The ruling did not exclude evidence about the County’s contention that scribe services could create situations involving legal advice or unauthorized practice of law when offered for other purposes, including the County’s argument that scribe services were not a reasonable accommodation. The court noted that it had previously rejected the argument that providing scribe services would itself constitute unauthorized practice of law.

The court denied Martinez’s Motion in Limine No. 2 without prejudice. That motion sought to exclude a March 29, 2012 text message. The court found the request premature because the message’s admissibility could not be evaluated without testimonial context.

The court denied Martinez’s Motion in Limine No. 3. Martinez had sought to limit evidence about later remedial measures and requested a jury instruction concerning technology introduced after her 2019 visit. The court found that the request was better suited to a proposed jury instruction and that the specific evidence had not been identified. It also found premature the request concerning possible testimony about later or planned technology changes.

The court denied Martinez’s Motion in Limine No. 4 without prejudice. That motion challenged legal conclusions in the report of the County’s expert, Cris Vaughan. Because neither party provided Vaughan’s report, the court could not evaluate the quoted opinions in context. The court declined the County’s request to exclude all expert testimony or limit it to hypothetical questions, finding expert analysis necessary for the jury to evaluate the auxiliary aids available to Martinez and later changes to the County’s systems if the jury found a legal violation in 2019.

Other Pretrial Rulings

The court overruled the County’s objection to several of Martinez’s proposed witnesses without prejudice because the County had not provided Martinez’s initial disclosures, preventing the court from evaluating the objection’s merits.

The court limited each side to 20 total hours for opening statements, evidence, closing statements, and rebuttal. It also set deadlines for exhibits, deposition and written-discovery designations, and updated lists of trial participants. The parties indicated that they planned to dismiss the individual defendants without prejudice, with a stipulation due March 4, 2024. The order set additional procedures concerning jury selection, hardship hearings, and trial equipment.