Rubalcava v. City Of San Jose

Background

The court held a final pretrial conference on April 23, 2024, and summarized its oral rulings on the parties’ motions in limine—requests to decide before trial whether particular evidence or arguments may be presented. A footnote states that the defendants had filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. The court stated its view that it retained jurisdiction to decide the motions in limine because they concerned issues separate from those involved in the appeal.

Rubalcava’s claims concern alleged fabrication of police reports about witness identifications, failure to disclose the circumstances of eyewitness identifications, and malicious prosecution. The parties disputed whether evidence of Rubalcava’s factual innocence was relevant to liability and damages, and whether it would be unfairly prejudicial or involve hearsay.

Plaintiff’s Motions

Motion No. 1—evidence of innocence. The court found that evidence of Rubalcava’s factual innocence was relevant to both liability and damages. It reasoned that evidence of innocence could make it more likely that defendants falsified police reports and less likely that the witnesses unequivocally identified Rubalcava as the shooter. The court also concluded that defendants had not shown that the evidence’s value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. It declined to limit the evidence to a statement that Rubalcava’s conviction had been vacated and stated that all evidence of factual innocence, including cellular-telephone evidence, was relevant. The court did not address defendants’ hearsay argument because it was not sufficiently developed. The supplied text does not include the concluding disposition line for Plaintiff’s Motion No. 1, but the court allowed the evidence of factual innocence and denied Defendants’ corresponding Motion No. 1.

Motion No. 2—alleged bad acts. The motion sought to exclude evidence involving Rubalcava’s criminal history, juvenile record, arrests and charges that did not result in convictions, school and prison disciplinary records, drug and alcohol use, and dating history. The court held that the briefing did not identify sufficiently what evidence defendants intended to offer or for what purposes. Plaintiff’s Motion No. 2 was DENIED without prejudice to objections to specific bad-acts evidence at trial. The court stated that Rubalcava could not remove all references to his criminal history and gang affiliation if those facts were relevant to what defendants knew, but defendants could not use bad-acts evidence without showing that it was admissible, relevant, and not unduly prejudicial.

Motion No. 3—gang-related evidence. The court held that some gang-related evidence could be directly relevant to Rubalcava’s claims and to the reasonableness of defendants’ investigative conduct, while other evidence could be marginally relevant and unfairly prejudicial. Because the court lacked the specific evidence and trial presentation needed to rule broadly, Plaintiff’s Motion No. 3 was DENIED without prejudice to objections at trial.

Motion No. 4—third-party evidence and testimony. The motion combined three categories of evidence: third-party legal or credibility opinions, evidence that third parties were responsible for Rubalcava’s wrongful conviction, and evidence or argument about settlements or payments. The court addressed only the challenge to the prosecutor’s testimony and struck the other two portions because they exceeded the permitted number of motions in limine. The court GRANTED the motion as to expert or lay testimony offering legal conclusions, including whether there was probable cause to charge Rubalcava. Prosecutor Mark Duffy could testify about the information he relied on in making the charging decision and other matters within his personal knowledge, but Rubalcava retained the right to make appropriate objections at trial.

Motion No. 5—opinions from Dr. Gaskell and Dr. Steward. The court considered only the challenge to rebuttal psychiatric expert Dr. Steven Gaskell and struck the portion concerning economics expert Dr. Dwight Steward because the motion combined separate requests. The court held that Dr. Gaskell’s opinion about the causes of Rubalcava’s symptoms and his diagnosis was proper rebuttal to the testimony of Rubalcava’s expert. Plaintiff’s Motion No. 5 was DENIED, with Dr. Gaskell’s testimony limited to Rubalcava’s damages.

Defendants’ Motions

Motion No. 1—innocence evidence. The defendants’ motion to exclude evidence and argument concerning Rubalcava’s innocence was DENIED for the reasons stated in the court’s discussion of Plaintiff’s Motion No. 1.

Motion No. 2—separate liability and damages phases. The defendants asked the court to divide the trial into separate liability and damages phases. The court declined to bifurcate the trial, reasoning that factual-innocence evidence related to both liability and damages and that presenting the same witnesses twice would not promote efficiency. The court also concluded that concerns about jury sympathy could be addressed with appropriate jury instructions. Defendants’ Motion No. 2 was DENIED.

Motion No. 3—witness order, deposition testimony, and leading questions. The defendants sought to question two of Rubalcava’s witnesses before Rubalcava did, bar Rubalcava from using their deposition testimony, and prohibit leading questions. The court rejected the request to change the ordinary order of questioning and declined to prejudge counsel’s questions. Defendants’ Motion No. 3 was DENIED. The court stated that defendants could use trial time to ask it to review particular deposition excerpts, provided the relevant surrounding context.

Motion No. 4—dismissed or abandoned parties and claims. The court GRANTED the motion to exclude evidence and argument concerning dismissed or abandoned parties and claims. The ruling did not prevent Rubalcava from presenting evidence relating to those parties or claims if the evidence also related to the remaining parties or claims or could be used for impeachment.

Motion No. 5—lay opinions about policies and probable cause. The defendants sought to prevent questioning about San Jose Police Department policies. The court DENIED the motion. It held that defendant officers could be questioned about their own understanding of policies governing their conduct, and that Stephen Donohue, identified as the City’s person most knowledgeable about those policies, could be questioned about the City’s policies. Rubalcava represented that he would not ask improper hypothetical questions.

Disposition

The order resolved pretrial evidentiary and trial-management issues. It did not decide the ultimate liability or damages questions in Rubalcava’s civil-rights case. Beth Labson Freeman signed the order on May 6, 2024.