Regal v. County of Santa Clara

Background

This is a civil-rights action under Section 1983 brought by Devin Regal and his siblings E.R. and C.R., through their guardian ad litem Michael Leitchman. The plaintiffs sued individually and as successors in interest to their father, Frederick Inea Regal, who died by suicide while held in a County of Santa Clara jail facility. The order records the court’s rulings on ten motions in limine, which are pretrial requests to admit or exclude evidence. The court had issued oral rulings at the May 23, 2025 Final Pretrial Conference.

Plaintiffs’ Motions

Motion 1: Subsequent suicide-prevention measures

The plaintiffs sought to admit evidence of suicide-prevention measures the County implemented after July 29, 2020, to show that those measures were feasible. The court granted the motion insofar as it concerned the County’s construction of suicide-resistant cells, but did so without prejudice to the County making a Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or other appropriate objection at trial. The court deferred its ruling on changed Unit 8A admission criteria and the County’s Ferguson blanket policy because the plaintiffs had not yet clearly identified the evidence or established the necessary foundation. The final order states that the motion was GRANTED IN PART AND DEFERRED IN PART.

Motion 2: Recording of Frederick and Eliana Regal

The plaintiffs sought to exclude a video recording of a July 27, 2020 telephone conversation between Frederick Regal and Eliana Regal. The court concluded that neither participant had consented to the recording and that no exception to the Federal Wiretap Act applied. It rejected the County’s argument that Rachel Regal was a party to the conversation because the evidence showed that she did not participate after Eliana took the phone. The court granted the plaintiffs’ second motion in limine.

Motion 3: Defense life-care-planning expert

The plaintiffs sought to exclude testimony from defense expert Cloie Johnson about the cost of future mental-health treatment. Because the plaintiffs sought no economic or special damages and Johnson would not quantify their noneconomic damages, the court found no sufficient connection between her testimony and the value of the plaintiffs’ loss-of-familial-association claim. The court also found that the testimony could confuse or mislead the jury. The court granted the plaintiffs’ third motion in limine.

Motion 4: Details of the 2016 and 2020 arrests

The plaintiffs sought to exclude detailed evidence about Frederick Regal’s 2016 and 2020 arrests and jail detentions. The court ruled that the evidence was relevant to noneconomic damages, including the reality of the plaintiffs’ relationship with Frederick and his life expectancy. But the court ruled that the 2016 arrest details were not relevant to liability because they concerned security-risk classification rather than the suicide-prevention measures challenged by the plaintiffs. The court also excluded the 2020 arrest details under Rule 403 as to liability because the County employees conducting the formal suicide-risk assessments had little knowledge of those details. The motion was therefore GRANTED insofar as the evidence was sought for liability issues, but DENIED insofar as it was sought for damages issues. The court invited the parties to propose a limiting instruction.

Motion 5: Drug-test results received after death

The plaintiffs sought to exclude drug-test results that the County received only after Frederick Regal’s death. The court ruled that the specific test results could not have informed the County’s suicide-prevention decisions and therefore were not relevant to liability. The ruling did not exclude all evidence of Frederick’s drug history or evidence known to County employees at the time of his arrest and intake, including behavior suggesting that he might be under the influence of drugs. The court found the test results relevant to noneconomic damages, including family closeness and life expectancy, and held that their value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The motion was GRANTED insofar as the evidence was sought for liability issues, but DENIED insofar as it was sought for damages issues.

The County’s Motions

Motion 1: Plaintiffs’ expert Lisa Boesky

The County sought to exclude testimony from Lisa Boesky, Ph.D., concerning causation, jail suicide-prevention standards, and the prevalence of suicide-resistant cells. The court denied the motion. Dr. Boesky could testify, based on her expertise, about whether County conduct was a substantial contributing factor to Frederick Regal’s suicide, although the County could challenge the limits of her opinion through cross-examination and closing argument. She could also testify about suicide-prevention standards and practices widely used in jails as relevant to notice and to help the jury understand the County’s protocols, but not to suggest that failing to meet an industry standard alone established constitutional liability. The court also declined at that stage to exclude her testimony about the prevalence of suicide-resistant cells, while allowing the County to seek to strike unsupported or speculative testimony at trial.

Motion 2: Chavez consent decree

The County sought to exclude evidence about its compliance with a federal consent decree and evidence showing that Deputy County Counsel Aryn Paige Harris was also lead counsel in that matter. The court GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART the motion. It excluded evidence about the County’s level of compliance or noncompliance with the decree and required that Harris’s name be redacted from any Chavez documents used at trial. But it allowed evidence about the decree to show notice, as well as discussion of the conditions and policies in effect while Frederick Regal was held in County custody. The court explained that the decree could not itself provide a basis for liability on the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims.

Motion 3: Plaintiffs’ expert Raymond A. Swanson

The County sought to exclude testimony from neurologist Raymond A. Swanson, M.D., about the duration of Frederick Regal’s pain and suffering before death. The court found Dr. Swanson qualified to testify about hypoxic/ischemic brain injury. However, it excluded opinions that people experiencing partial hangings take longer to lose consciousness and that Frederick Regal might have remained conscious for more than 25 seconds, because those opinions lacked sufficient facts or data. The court permitted testimony that consciousness could last between 13 and 25 seconds. The motion was GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Motion 4: Fifteen-minute checks

The County sought to exclude evidence of allegedly missed or untimely fifteen-minute checks by correctional deputies. The court granted the motion because the plaintiffs’ theory challenged the County’s customs and practices concerning suicide-risk housing and prevention measures, not systemic failures to carry out the checks. The court concluded that isolated or sporadic incidents could not establish the persistent and widespread conduct required for the plaintiffs’ municipal-liability theory. The order did not prevent the plaintiffs from using the evidence for impeachment.

Motion 5: Cross-examination of Edward Kaftarian

The County sought to limit the plaintiffs’ cross-examination of its expert, Edward Kaftarian, M.D., to the subjects in his expert report concerning the County’s suicide-prevention program and the plaintiffs’ allegations about that program. The court deferred ruling because the propriety of particular questions could not be determined in the abstract. The County could object or request a sidebar at trial if questioning moved beyond the scope of Dr. Kaftarian’s report and opinions.

Final Disposition

Judge Beth Freeman’s final order states: (1) the plaintiffs’ first motion was GRANTED IN PART AND DEFERRED IN PART; (2) the plaintiffs’ second and third motions were GRANTED; (3) the plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth motions were GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; (4) the County’s first motion was DENIED; (5) the County’s second and third motions were GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; (6) the County’s fourth motion was GRANTED; and (7) the County’s fifth motion was DEFERRED.