Sanderlin v. City of San Jose

Background

This is a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California’s Bane Act. The plaintiffs are Derrick Sanderlin, Cayla Sanderlin, Breanna Contreras, Pietro di Donato, Adira Sharkey, Joseph Stukes, and Vera Clanton. The defendants are the City of San Jose, Sergeant Lee Tassio, Officer Michael Panighetti, Officer Juan Avila, and Officer Jonathan Marshall. The plaintiffs sued over injuries sustained while participating in civil-rights demonstrations responding to the murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin.

The court held the final pretrial conference on April 17, 2025, and issued oral rulings on the parties’ motions in limine, which are requests to decide before trial whether particular evidence may be presented. This order summarized those rulings.

Plaintiffs’ Motions

Motion No. 1: Violence, injuries, and property damage. The plaintiffs sought to exclude images and other media depicting violence, officer injuries, and property damage, arguing that the evidence was irrelevant and inflammatory. The defendants argued that the evidence could inform the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for the Fourth Amendment claims, as well as issues involving intent, retaliatory motive, and the Bane Act claims.

The court DENIED the motion. It held that the evidence could be relevant to whether the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable, including the circumstances known to the officers and the actions of people surrounding the person subjected to force. The evidence could also bear on the First Amendment retaliation claim and the Bane Act’s specific-intent requirement. The court found that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the evidence’s value. However, the audio accompanying the 5/29 Highway 101 ABC7 Clip, exhibit SJ405878, and the 5/29 Protest Drone Footage, exhibit SJ003741, will be excluded. Plaintiffs’ counsel may renew a request for a limiting instruction at trial by submitting proposed language and requesting that the court read it to the jury.

Motion No. 2: Highway protests. The plaintiffs sought to exclude testimony, images, and other media concerning protesters, including plaintiffs, walking on Highways 101 and 280. The defendants argued that the evidence could affect credibility, the Fourth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the First Amendment retaliation analysis, the Bane Act specific-intent analysis, and the defense that the protests presented a clear and present danger.

The court DENIED the motion. It found that the evidence could be used to impeach credibility and could potentially inform the circumstances confronting officers when force was used. It also could bear on retaliatory animus, whether officers would have taken the same action without a retaliatory motive, and specific intent under the Bane Act. The court acknowledged that some videos could be inflammatory but concluded that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice.

Motion No. 3: Officers’ character and reputation. The plaintiffs sought to exclude evidence about the defendant officers’ character or reputation in the police department and the San Jose community. The court GRANTS the motion insofar as it seeks to exclude pure character evidence offered to show that the officers acted consistently with a particular character trait on the days at issue. The court noted that evidence of officer certifications or conduct is not necessarily improper character evidence because it could, for example, show training or background. The plaintiffs may object at trial to specific evidence offered for an improper propensity purpose. The court will consider at that time whether the evidence is admissible for another purpose under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), such as proving motive or intent. The court’s final order states that ruling on specific challenged evidence under Rule 404(b) is DEFERRED.

Defendants’ Motions

Motion No. 1: Dismissed defendants and claims. The defendants sought to exclude references, arguments, and evidence concerning the conduct of dismissed defendants and conduct related to dismissed claims. The plaintiffs did not oppose the motion and stated that they did not intend to allege wrongdoing against former defendants or discuss the dismissed claims. The court GRANTS the unopposed motion.

Motion No. 2: Unidentified officers or employees. The defendants sought to exclude evidence concerning unnamed or unidentified City officers, employees, or agents. They argued that the plaintiffs could not assign responsibility to unidentified employees without speculation and that they should not be allowed to add new defendants at the late stage of the case. The plaintiffs argued that a jury could find, using direct and circumstantial evidence, that a San Jose police officer fired the projectiles that injured them and that the City could be vicariously liable even if the employee was not identified by name.

The court DENIES the motion. Under California law, a public entity may be liable for an injury caused by an employee acting within the scope of employment when the employee’s conduct would have created liability apart from the public-entity-liability statute. The court concluded that a plaintiff need not ultimately prove exactly which employee committed the act if the evidence shows that some employee acting within the scope of employment tortiously caused the injury. The court also recognized that liability for unconstitutional conduct can potentially rest on integral participation. But the plaintiffs may not speculate about facts, including where a projectile came from or why it struck a plaintiff, and a person cannot be held liable solely because of group membership without proof of individual participation.

Motion No. 3: Dr. Edward Maguire’s testimony. The defendants sought to exclude the opinions and testimony of the plaintiffs’ police-practices expert, Dr. Edward Maguire. They argued that his opinions were directed to Monell claims that had already been resolved in favor of the City on summary judgment and were irrelevant, prejudicial, confusing, speculative, or improper legal conclusions. The plaintiffs argued that his testimony could help the jury assess the level of force used against Derrick Sanderlin and possible alternatives for dispersing the crowd.

The court GRANTS the motion and states that Dr. Maguire’s testimony shall be excluded. The court reasoned that the Monell claims were no longer live and that remaining City liability had to be based on vicarious liability for wrongful conduct by an individual City employee or agent. The court found that testimony about whether department-wide practices, policies, or responses met nationally accepted police standards would have limited value and could confuse the jury or lead it to attribute collective departmental failings to an individual officer. The court also expressed concern about speculation and legal conclusions. However, if the plaintiffs submit by April 25, 2025, a brief identifying specific portions of the report that remain relevant and fall within the disclosed areas of expertise, the defendants may respond and the court will revisit whether appropriately limited testimony may be admitted.

Motion No. 4: Testimony by certain plaintiffs. The defendants sought to limit testimony by Breanna Contreras, Pietro di Donato, Joseph Stukes, and Adira Sharkey about whether a City officer targeted or aimed at them, whether an unidentified officer fired the projectile that struck them, what type of projectile was involved, and an officer’s state of mind. The defendants argued that these plaintiffs did not know which officer, if any, fired the projectile and should be limited to describing what they personally perceived.

The court GRANTS the motion. The plaintiffs may testify about their own perceptions, such as what they personally saw or heard, but they may not speculate about what item struck them, where it originated, or the intent or retaliatory motive of a City employee accused of interfering with their rights.

Cayla Sanderlin’s Bane Act claim

The court clarified that Cayla Sanderlin does not have a surviving Bane Act claim. At summary judgment, the court determined that she was not seized and that she had not shown a genuine dispute of material fact about whether unreasonable force was used against her. Because her Fourth Amendment claim had been resolved against her, and the parties’ pretrial statement said that all Bane Act claims were based on alleged Fourth Amendment violations, the court ruled that she has no Bane Act claim to present at trial.

Disposition

The court ordered that Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 1 is DENIED, with the specified audio excluded; Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 2 is DENIED; Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. 3 is GRANTED as to character evidence offered for propensity purposes, with ruling on specific Rule 404(b) evidence DEFERRED; Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1 is GRANTED; Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2 is DENIED; Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 3 is GRANTED, subject to possible reconsideration after a supplemental brief and response; Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 4 is GRANTED; and Cayla Sanderlin does not have a surviving Bane Act claim.