Anderson v. Berryhill
- Steven Rau
- 0:17-cv-01650
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 15
In Anderson v. Berryhill, Judge Rau affirmed the disability-benefits denial, denied Anderson’s motion, granted the Commissioner’s motion, and dismissed the case.
Roxann Louise Anderson, whose denial of disability insurance benefits was upheld, and the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, whose motion for summary judgment was granted.
What happened
In Anderson v. Berryhill, Roxann Louise Anderson asked the court to review the denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. She argued that the administrative law judge overlooked limitations, incorrectly found that her impairments did not meet disability-listing requirements, and improperly discounted her pain complaints.
The Commissioner argued that Anderson had not shown she was disabled and that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s decision. The court agreed, finding sufficient evidence for the determination that Anderson could perform light work, did not meet Listings 1.02 or 1.04, and had symptoms less severe than she claimed.
Judge Rau affirmed the administrative decision, denied Anderson’s motion for summary judgment, granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case.
The detailed version
- Anderson v. Berryhill · No. 0:17-cv-01650
- Steven Rau
- Aug. 13, 2018
Background
Roxann Louise Anderson sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. Anderson alleged disability based on head trauma, problems with her neck and back, and left-leg pain. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits after applying the Social Security Administration’s five-step disability process. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision final.
The ALJ found that Anderson had severe impairments involving degenerative disc disease in her cervical and lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease in both hips, and an organic mental disorder with some cognitive deficits. The ALJ determined that these impairments did not meet or medically equal Listings 1.02 or 1.04, which address specified joint and spine disorders. The ALJ assigned Anderson a residual functional capacity (RFC)—the most she could still do despite her impairments—of light work with limits on lifting, sitting, standing, walking, reaching, climbing, and workplace interactions. The ALJ also limited her to simple, routine, repetitive tasks and simple work-related decisions. The ALJ concluded that Anderson could perform past relevant work as a house cleaner and assembler of small parts and therefore was not disabled.
Arguments and Analysis
Anderson moved for summary judgment, arguing that the ALJ improperly omitted limitations from the RFC, incorrectly evaluated Listings 1.02 and 1.04, and improperly discounted her subjective complaints about pain and other symptoms. The Commissioner also moved for summary judgment, arguing that Anderson had not met her burden of proving disability and that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings.
The court applied deferential review. It explained that “substantial evidence” means sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to support the Commissioner’s findings, and that the court could not reweigh the evidence or reverse merely because another conclusion might also have been supported.
The court upheld the RFC determination. It relied on evidence that Anderson had performed physical therapy successfully, walked, biked, attended water aerobics, and looked for cleaning work before surgery. The court also relied on her surgeon’s postoperative findings that she was doing very well, reported low-intensity pain, was not taking pain medication, had normal strength and gait, and had a good prognosis.
The court also upheld the ALJ’s Listings analysis. Although the ALJ’s discussion of Listings 1.02 and 1.04 could have included clearer and more specific record citations, the court found that other portions of the ALJ’s decision supplied supporting reasons. Those reasons included evidence of normal or near-normal strength, gait, range of motion, reflexes, and straight-leg testing, as well as no evidence of neurological compromise, muscle atrophy, or lower-extremity weakness.
Finally, the court upheld the ALJ’s evaluation of Anderson’s subjective complaints. The court found substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s consideration of Anderson’s daily activities, conservative treatment, decisions to decline some treatment options, exercise, and postoperative improvement.
Ruling
The court concluded that the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Judge Steven E. Rau ordered that Anderson’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED, the Acting Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, and the case be DISMISSED.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.