Nancy G. v. Saul

Background

Nancy G. challenged the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. She alleged an onset date of March 26, 2014, but the administrative law judge (ALJ) allowed her to amend that date to November 19, 2015. The ALJ denied the claim on February 28, 2018, and the Appeals Council denied review.

The ALJ found that Nancy G. had severe degenerative disc disease in her lumbar and cervical spine. The ALJ determined that she did not have an impairment meeting or equaling a listed impairment and assigned her a residual functional capacity allowing limited light work. Among other restrictions, she could lift up to 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently, could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and was limited to frequent—but not constant—handling with both hands.

The ALJ found that Nancy G. could not perform her past relevant work but could perform other jobs existing in the national economy. The vocational expert identified bench assembler, sub-assembler, and inspector/hand packager as representative occupations.

Nancy G.’s Argument

Nancy G.’s sole argument was that the ALJ’s step-five finding lacked substantial evidence. She asserted that the vocational expert’s testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, a Labor Department guide describing job requirements.

Her argument relied on a chain of inferences: the jobs were classified as light work; the vocational expert testified that they involved negligible weight; the jobs therefore supposedly qualified as light work because of constant pushing or pulling; and constant pushing or pulling supposedly required constant handling. Nancy G. argued that this exceeded the ALJ’s limitation to frequent handling.

Court’s Analysis

The court found no conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The court stated that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles expressly classified the handling required for each identified job as frequent, not constant. That classification was consistent with the hypothetical question based on the ALJ’s residual functional capacity limitations.

The court also found that the vocational expert’s testimony was based on a correctly worded hypothetical question. Because the vocational expert’s testimony did not conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the court concluded that the ALJ’s finding that Nancy G. could perform other work was supported by substantial evidence.

Disposition

The court denied Nancy G.’s motion for summary judgment, granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the matter. The opinion does not add a “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” designation to the dismissal.