Ash v. City of Duluth

Background

Davenell L. Ash owns and operates Unique Beauty & Hair Supply, L.L.C., a salon and beauty-supply retail outlet in Duluth, Minnesota. Ash is African American, and the business serves African-American and other non-Caucasian customers. Ash and Unique Beauty alleged that the City of Duluth and its employees discriminated against them because of Ash’s race during six incidents or ongoing courses of conduct between April 2012 and September 2017.

The allegations involved police responses to a reported shoplifting and sexual assault, advice to remove signs showing African-American and other non-Caucasian models, a threat to label the business a nuisance business, the alleged failure to arrest or prosecute trespassers, selective parking enforcement, and the arrival of City fire trucks and emergency vehicles at the business. Ash also alleged that City employees towed her vehicle in April 2017 without a legal basis.

The City moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The motion challenged four claims against the City: a race-discrimination claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; an equal-protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and a Minnesota common-law conversion claim concerning Ash’s vehicle. The City’s motion did not address Ash’s separate Fourth Amendment claim, which was not asserted against the City.

Title VI claim

The court construed the Title VI claim as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI prohibits intentional race, color, or national-origin discrimination in a federally funded program or activity. The court explained that a plaintiff must be an intended beneficiary of the federally funded program and must show a connection between the alleged discrimination and that particular program or activity.

The plaintiffs alleged that the City received federal funds from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and under the Workforce Investment Act. But the alleged discrimination involved the City’s police department, parking-enforcement office, and fire department. The court held that the plaintiffs did not allege that they were intended beneficiaries of the identified funds or that the alleged discrimination had the required connection to a specific federally funded program. The court therefore granted the City’s motion to dismiss the Title VI claim.

Section 1983 claim

Section 1983 permits a claim for deprivation of federal rights under color of state law. A municipality cannot be held liable merely because it employs a person who allegedly violated someone’s rights. The complaint instead must connect the injury to an inadequate training practice, an official policy, or an unofficial municipal custom.

The plaintiffs did not allege that an inadequate-training practice or official policy caused their injury, so the court considered whether they had adequately alleged an unofficial municipal custom. Such a claim requires facts supporting a continuing and widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct, notice or authorization by municipal policymakers, and a connection between the custom and the plaintiff’s injury.

The court focused on the notice or authorization requirement. It held that the plaintiffs did not allege facts showing that a policymaking official received notice of the alleged constitutional violations, authorized them, or deliberately ignored them. The court also rejected the request to delay consideration of the City’s motion so the plaintiffs could conduct discovery about the identities of Officers 1-10, explaining that those identities were immaterial to whether the plaintiffs stated a Section 1983 claim against the City. The court granted the motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim.

Section 1981 claim

Section 1981 protects equal rights to make and enforce contracts and to receive the full and equal benefit of laws and legal proceedings. The court explained that, against a state actor, a federal claim enforcing Section 1981 rights must be brought through Section 1983. Because the plaintiffs failed to state a Section 1983 claim against the City, the court held that they also failed to state a Section 1981 claim. The court granted the motion to dismiss that claim.

Conversion claim

Under Minnesota law, conversion is willful interference with personal property that, without lawful justification, deprives someone entitled to the property of its use and possession. The complaint alleged that the City towed Ash’s vehicle in April 2017 without a warrant, consent, or any other lawful reason and charged her $200 for the tow.

The court held that these allegations plausibly stated that Ash had a property interest in the vehicle and that the City deprived her of that interest without lawful justification. The court also explained that the relevant intent is the intent to deal with the property in a way that causes dispossession; the plaintiff need not allege that the City specifically intended to commit conversion. The court denied the City’s motion to dismiss Ash’s common-law conversion claim.

Disposition

The court ordered that the City’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiffs’ Title VI, Section 1983, and Section 1981 claims against the City were dismissed without prejudice. The court did not dismiss Ash’s common-law conversion claim against the City. Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright signed the order.