Doe v. North Homes, Inc.

Background

Jane Doe alleged that she was a juvenile resident at the I.T.A.S.K.I.N. Juvenile Center in 2014. North Homes, Inc. owned and operated the center, and Connie Ross was its director and administrator. Doe alleged that, after she was detained in a secure unit, guard Devin Michael Wood made sexual advances toward her and engaged in sexual acts with her, including sexual intercourse. She also alleged that Ross and John Does 1 through 10 harassed and punished her after Wood’s arrest, including by continuing her detention in the secure unit.

Doe brought four counts. Counts I through III were civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleged that Wood and John Does 1 through 10 violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Count II made similar allegations against North Homes and Ross in her official capacity. Count III alleged that Ross, in her individual capacity, violated Doe’s First Amendment rights. Count IV was a negligence claim under Minnesota law.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Doe separately appealed a magistrate judge’s order denying her request to proceed under a pseudonym.

Civil-rights claims

The court held that a § 1983 claim requires a person to have acted under color of state law—that is, to have acted as a state actor or through authority sufficiently connected to the state. The court explained that private conduct generally is not actionable under § 1983. A private party may qualify as a state actor in circumstances such as performing a function traditionally reserved to the state, jointly participating with the state, or being pervasively intertwined with the state.

The court found that Doe’s complaint did not plausibly allege that North Homes or its employees were state actors. The allegation that North Homes “worked in concert” with Minnesota counties was too vague to show that the state delegated custody or control to North Homes or jointly performed public functions with it. The complaint also alleged that the agreement to enroll Doe at the center was between Kanabec County and Doe’s foster mother, and that North Homes alone decided whether residents would be detained in the secure unit. The court further stated that state regulation, even extensive regulation, does not by itself convert a private organization’s conduct into state action.

The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Doe’s § 1983 claims against all defendants without prejudice. Although Wood did not move to dismiss or join the motion, the court dismissed the § 1983 claims against him because the same state-action requirement applied and the complaint did not plausibly allege that he was a state actor.

Negligence claim

The court stated that Doe did not allege, and the record did not establish, a basis for original federal jurisdiction over her Minnesota negligence claim. The claim could remain in federal court only through supplemental jurisdiction, which allows a federal court to hear certain related state-law claims.

Because the federal claims were being dismissed early in the case, discovery had not begun, and little judicial effort had been spent, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the negligence claim. The court noted that a state forum remained available for that claim. The order dismissed Doe’s complaint without prejudice; the opinion did not separately state a disposition for Count IV beyond explaining that the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over it.

Pseudonym request

Doe sought permission to proceed under a pseudonym because she alleged that she had been a child victim of sexual assault. The magistrate judge denied the request, reasoning that Doe’s identity as Wood’s victim was already publicly known because a Facebook account had posted a news story about Wood’s guilty pleas and a user named Doe had commented on it.

Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright reviewed that nondispositive ruling under a deferential standard and concluded that it was clearly erroneous. The court recognized the general presumption that parties identify themselves, but explained that privacy protections may apply in cases involving highly intimate matters. The court concluded that the Facebook comment did not show that Doe’s identity as the victim was so widely known that pseudonym protection would provide no benefit. The comment also did not unambiguously identify Doe as the victim.

The court determined that the totality of the circumstances strongly favored protecting Doe’s privacy because the case involved alleged sexual abuse of a vulnerable child. Doe’s current status as an adult did not eliminate that privacy interest, and the court found that protecting her identity would cause minimal prejudice to the defendants, particularly because the complaint was being dismissed. The court reversed the June 6, 2019 order denying Doe’s request and granted Doe’s motion for a protective order allowing her to proceed under a pseudonym.

Disposition

The court ordered that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted; Doe’s complaint was dismissed without prejudice; the June 6, 2019 order of United States Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois was reversed; and Doe’s motion for a protective order was granted.