Sellner v. MAT Holdings, Inc.

Background

Douglas James Sellner sued his former employer, MAT Industries, LLC, under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. Sellner claimed that MAT terminated him from his Quality Engineering Technician position because he refused to falsify testing data concerning air compressors. MAT denied that claim and asserted that it terminated Sellner for unacceptable conduct, including offensive statements, poor relationships with coworkers, and conduct that harmed workplace productivity.

The court had previously dismissed Sellner’s whistleblower claim on summary judgment, but the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to proceed on whether Sellner’s protected conduct was connected to his firing. The case was tried to an eleven-person jury beginning May 14, 2018. After hearing twelve witnesses and receiving more than 100 exhibits, the jury found that Sellner reported a violation of law to MAT or a governmental body, but that the report was not a motivating factor in MAT’s decision to terminate him.

Sellner moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. The court noted that it could order a new trial to prevent a miscarriage of justice, but that it could not simply replace the jury’s view of the evidence with its own.

Challenged Evidence

Sellner argued that the court improperly admitted testimony about alleged eavesdropping on neighbors, spyware, sexually suggestive karaoke song titles, and collecting information about neighborhood affairs. He contended that the decisionmakers did not know about these matters and that the evidence improperly harmed his character before the jury.

The court rejected the argument. It found that the evidence helped support witnesses’ descriptions of a toxic workplace partly caused by Sellner. Because workplace dysfunction was one of MAT’s stated reasons for the termination, the jury could consider the evidence. The court also concluded that excluding it would not likely have produced a different verdict.

Sellner separately challenged the admission of an anonymous email that coworker Ryan Schwartz sent to MAT’s corporate office. The court assumed, without deciding, that the email might have been improperly admitted, but held that its admission did not affect Sellner’s substantial rights. Sellner’s counsel extensively cross-examined Schwartz, including about the email’s authorship and whether it reflected the views of other lab employees. The court concluded that the jury had enough information to assess Schwartz’s credibility.

Sellner also argued that the court should have admitted Exhibit 179, which purportedly showed that Schwartz modified test results. The court held that admitting the exhibit would not likely have changed the verdict because Schwartz had already been thoroughly cross-examined about his role, his interactions with Sellner, and alleged differences between his deposition and trial testimony.

Trial Management and Judicial Comments

Sellner argued that the court imposed burdensome time limits and made comments in front of the jury that prejudiced his case. The court stated that trial judges have broad discretion to manage trials, including setting reasonable time limits and making comments related to trial management.

The court explained that the parties knew the trial schedule in advance and that the case took eight trial days after accounting for two half-day recesses. That exceeded Sellner’s counsel’s estimate by two days, but the court recalled no instance in which testimony was improperly cut off, and no objection to the court’s time management had been made during trial.

The court also noted that no trial transcript had been ordered, which significantly limited its ability to review Sellner’s claims. Based on the court’s recollection, however, it expected the transcript to show that Sellner’s counsel had adequate time and that no judicial comment deprived Sellner of a fair jury trial.

Expert Testimony

Sellner argued that he should have been allowed to present expert testimony about the safety of the compressor and pump because defense witnesses had discussed those subjects. The court rejected this argument. It had already ruled before trial that expert testimony was unnecessary to determine whether Sellner’s alleged whistleblowing contributed to his termination.

The court emphasized that this was a single-count Minnesota whistleblower case, not a products-liability case. Testimony from experts about air-compressor safety therefore was not relevant to whether Sellner’s protected conduct played a role in his termination.

Jury Instructions

Sellner challenged Jury Instruction 13. He argued that the instruction should have identified the specific law allegedly violated by the request to falsify testing data. He also argued that the instruction should have used “played a part” rather than “motivating factor” when describing causation.

The court rejected both arguments. It found that the instruction followed Minnesota’s model jury instructions and correctly stated the elements of the claim. The court also noted that the instructions as a whole explained that a report or refusal was a motivating factor if it played a part in MAT’s decision to discharge Sellner. The court concluded that the instructions fairly and adequately presented the applicable law to the jury.

Disposition

Judge Ann D. Montgomery denied Douglas James Sellner’s Motion for New Trial. The opinion does not order a new trial or alter the jury’s verdict.