Orwa A. v. Sessions

Background

Orwa A. and Farok H., a married couple who reside in Minnesota and are natives and citizens of Iraq, sought to become United States citizens. Farok H.’s immigration status began with temporary religious-worker employment and later changed to an immigrant classification. The former Immigration and Naturalization Service approved his application to adjust to lawful permanent-resident status in 2002.

After Farok H. applied for naturalization, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application. USCIS concluded that he had not been lawfully admitted as a permanent resident because he had worked for the Islamic Cultural Community Center while his temporary visa authorized work only for Al-Amal School. USCIS also found that he lacked good moral character, although the first federal case resolved the naturalization issue on the lawful-admission ground.

In the earlier round of this case, the District of Minnesota affirmed USCIS’s denials of the couple’s naturalization applications, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The couple later sought to have their permanent-resident status treated as effective retroactively to August 2002 based on a different immigration route connected to their United States-citizen daughter. They also filed new naturalization applications. After an immigration hearing, USCIS denied the request for retroactive adjustment and again denied the naturalization applications.

Issues and analysis

The government moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning its legal authority to hear a dispute. Rule 12(b)(6) concerns whether the pleading states a legally sufficient claim.

The court first held that 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), which permits district-court review of a denied naturalization application, did not authorize review of the couple’s separate request for retroactive adjustment to lawful permanent-resident status. The court emphasized that permanent-resident status and naturalization are distinct classifications and that the retroactive-adjustment request was made through separate forms and was a prerequisite to, rather than part of, the naturalization applications.

The court also analyzed 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief under the adjustment-of-status statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The court concluded that USCIS’s decision denying the couple’s requested retroactive adjustment was a judgment regarding relief under § 1255(i). It rejected the argument that the result should differ because USCIS denied the request to file the forms rather than adjudicating the forms themselves. The court stated that either way, the requested relief had been denied. The court therefore concluded that the statutory jurisdictional bar applied and did not reach the government’s alternative argument that the decision was committed to agency discretion.

For the naturalization claims, the court applied claim preclusion, also called res judicata. This doctrine prevents a party from relitigating a claim that was resolved by a final judgment on the merits involving the same parties and the same cause of action. The court held that the earlier case satisfied those requirements. It reasoned that the couple sought redress for the same alleged wrong, and that, apart from the retroactive-adjustment request, they identified no new facts relevant to their naturalization applications. The court stated that the earlier final judgment controlled the naturalization claims unless the couple’s status changed.

The court also addressed allegations concerning USCIS’s Controlled Application and Resolution Program. It stated that the petition did not clearly assert a separate claim based on those allegations and that, in any event, the allegations were too general to state a plausible claim. The court further rejected the couple’s attempt to raise a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act for the first time in their opposition brief. The court stated that the petition did not assert such a claim, the allegations were insufficient, and the earlier judgment precluded a claim based on the same employment facts.

Disposition

The opinion states that the government’s motion to dismiss would be granted. However, the operative order did not immediately enter a final order or judgment. Instead, it permitted—but did not require—the parties to file briefs of no more than 2,500 words addressing whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the retroactive-adjustment request. Any such brief was due December 19, 2018. The opinion is signed by Judge Eric C. Tostrud.