United States v. Wedington

Background

Calvin Wedington is a federal prisoner serving a life sentence for second-degree murder imposed in 1982. In 2005, the court committed him to FMC-Rochester for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4245. In April 2019, he filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) seeking a hearing on whether he should be discharged from commitment and placed in the general prison population.

After an evidentiary hearing and briefing, Magistrate Judge Steven E. Rau recommended denying Wedington’s motion and continuing his custody under § 4245. Wedington objected to the recommendation.

Legal standard and arguments

Under § 4245, an inmate may be discharged from commitment if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence—meaning that the fact is more likely true than not—that at least one of three conditions exists: he is not presently suffering from a mental disease or defect; he does not need custody for treatment of that condition; or the facility is unsuitable for his care or treatment.

Wedington challenged only the conclusion that he was still “in need of custody” for treatment. He argued that he had recovered enough that custody was no longer necessary, and that the recommendation improperly treated his need for treatment as the same as his need for custody. He pointed to evidence that his mental state and overall well-being had improved since his commitment in 2005. He acknowledged that he had said he would stop taking his psychotropic medication if released, but argued that he could be treated for schizophrenia without that medication and without remaining in custody.

Court’s analysis

The court reviewed the recommendation de novo, meaning it independently reviewed the challenged issues. It concluded that the recommendation correctly addressed whether Wedington needed custody for treatment. The court explained that an inmate may need custody when untreated mental illness would make him a danger to himself or others. A person may pose a danger to himself when mental illness prevents him from making rational decisions about medical care.

The court held that the recommendation was not based on an assumption that Wedington’s treatment would end if his commitment were lifted. Instead, it relied on undisputed record evidence that Wedington would stop taking his psychotropic medication if released. The record also showed that stopping the medication would cause him to deteriorate, as he had in the past, and could make him a risk to himself or others. The court therefore concluded that Wedington remained in need of custody for treatment.

Disposition

The court overruled Wedington’s objection, adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety, and denied Wedington’s motion for a hearing date under § 4247(h). It ordered that Wedington remain in the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment until he is no longer in need of that custody for care and treatment. Judge David S. Doty directed that judgment be entered accordingly.