Trice v. Napoli Shkolnik PLLC

Background

Bridgette Trice, acting as trustee for the heirs and next of kin of her deceased daughter, Devyn Bolton, had sued Toyota over a 2006 crash. The law firm Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik LLP (NBRS) joined the Toyota litigation in 2012. Napoli Shkolnik PLLC (NS), Paul Napoli Law PLLC (PNL), and Hunter J. Shkolnik were later named as defendants in Trice’s legal-malpractice case.

Trice alleged that the attorneys made an unauthorized settlement demand to Toyota and failed to disclose the full amount of Bolton’s medical expenses during discovery. After NBRS was terminated, Trice’s replacement attorneys learned that about $500,000 in medical expenses had not been disclosed and that Trice’s damages expert had not been disclosed before trial. At trial, Toyota stipulated to medical expenses disclosed during discovery but refused to stipulate to expenses that had not been disclosed. The court limited the medical expenses admissible at trial to the amount disclosed.

After the Toyota trial, NS sought payment for the value of its legal services under quantum meruit, an equitable theory allowing recovery for the reasonable value of services provided. The court denied that request, finding that Trice had not benefited from NS’s representation and that NS had not proved the requested fees were reasonable. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that decision. Trice then filed this separate malpractice action, seeking approximately $750,000 in damages plus interest for undisclosed medical expenses.

Summary-judgment motions

Trice sought summary judgment under collateral estoppel, res judicata, and law of the case. These are doctrines that can prevent a party from relitigating issues or claims decided in an earlier proceeding. The court denied the motion. It held that the prior attorney-fee dispute and the malpractice action involved different questions: the earlier proceeding focused on the reasonable value of NS’s services, while this case required proof of an attorney-client relationship, negligent or otherwise improper conduct, causation, and damages. The earlier fee proceeding was also a summary proceeding that did not provide the same discovery, depositions, motion practice, or jury-trial opportunities available in the malpractice case. The court therefore found that applying the preclusion doctrines would be unfair.

The defendants sought summary judgment or dismissal on several grounds. As to Shkolnik personally, the court held that Trice had not provided expert evidence identifying specific negligent acts by Shkolnik or explaining how he personally breached the professional standard of care. The alleged negligent acts were attributed to former NBRS attorney Thomas Cleere. The court also held that NBRS’s limited-liability-partnership structure protected Shkolnik from personal liability for obligations of the partnership or another partner merely because he was a partner. The claims against Shkolnik were therefore dismissed.

The court denied summary judgment for NS and PNL on successor liability. NS had repeatedly represented that it was formerly NBRS and had performed work in the Toyota litigation. A declaration submitted by defendants also stated that the Toyota matter was assigned to PNL after the NBRS firm split. The court held that these representations created factual disputes about whether NS or PNL agreed to assume NBRS’s liabilities.

The court also denied summary judgment on Trice’s negligence claim concerning the undisclosed medical expenses. It found evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Toyota would have stipulated to billed medical expenses if they had been disclosed, that the records and bills existed, and that NBRS may have been responsible for producing them. The court rejected the argument that Trice could not bring a claim for medical expenses because some expenses were paid through medical assistance; it held that a recipient may pursue such a claim even when the expenses are subject to government liens, subrogation, or assignment rights. The court further held that Trice satisfied Minnesota Statutes section 544.42, which requires an attorney affidavit identifying expert testimony in professional-negligence cases.

Expert-evidence motions

Trice moved to exclude portions of the defendants’ expert Charles D. Slane’s opinion. The court granted the motion because the challenged portions addressed legal issues for the judge, including what evidence was required to prove medical expenses and whether Trice had the right to pursue expenses paid through medical assistance. The court also found that the expert’s statement about medical-assistance payments was not an accurate statement of Minnesota law.

The defendants moved to exclude portions of Trice’s expert Sam Hanson’s opinion. The court denied that motion. It held that Hanson’s experience as a trial and appellate lawyer, including work involving medical-malpractice and personal-injury cases and service on Minnesota’s appellate courts, qualified him to address the professional standard of care and causation. The court found a sufficient evidentiary basis for his opinions about the undisclosed medical expenses and resulting harm. It stated that challenges to the credibility of the supporting evidence could be addressed through cross-examination. The court deferred a separate argument under Evidence Rule 403 until trial.

Disposition

The court denied Trice’s motion for summary judgment; granted Trice’s motion to exclude portions of expert opinion; denied the defendants’ motion to exclude expert opinion; and granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and to dismiss. Under that last ruling, the claims against Hunter J. Shkolnik were dismissed, and the defendants’ summary-judgment motion was denied in all other respects.