Daywitt v. Harpstead

Background

Kenneth S. Daywitt was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). He alleged that he is openly gay and that MSOP employees knowingly or negligently placed him in the same cell as a person who was known to be homophobic, threatening, and mentally ill. According to the complaint, that person repeatedly harassed and threatened Daywitt because of his sexual orientation and attacked him on May 29, 2018, causing injury.

Daywitt originally sued 16 MSOP employees in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law that allows claims against state officials for constitutional violations. He also sued the Minnesota Department of Human Services Commissioner and MSOP’s Executive Director in their official capacities. After an earlier dismissal order directed him to provide more detail about the individual defendants, Daywitt filed the Second Amended Complaint.

Claims and Arguments

The Second Amended Complaint asserted three claims. Count 1 alleged that the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to Daywitt’s safety and failed to protect him. Count 2 alleged that the Commissioner and Executive Director maintained an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice of failing to protect LGBTQ patients or clients from hate crimes and harassment based on sexual orientation. Count 3 alleged negligence by the individual defendants.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. They argued that Counts 1 and 3 did not adequately state claims against the individual defendants. They also argued that qualified immunity barred the civil-rights claim and that official immunity barred the negligence claim. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from liability for civil-rights violations when the alleged right was not clearly established. Official immunity, as discussed by the court, can protect officials from certain negligence claims unless their conduct was willful or malicious.

Court’s Analysis

For the deliberate-indifference claim, the court explained that Daywitt had to plausibly allege both a sufficiently serious risk to his safety and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk. The court noted allegations that Daywitt repeatedly complained to the defendants, that other MSOP clients reported the assailant’s conduct to some defendants, and that the defendants personally observed or heard threatening and hateful statements.

The complaint also included more specific allegations about particular defendants. Other MSOP clients allegedly complained to Justin Joslin about threats and harassment. Daywitt alleged that the assailant threatened him directly in front of Travis Cowell and Cheryl Floren, and that Floren acknowledged the assailant’s hatred of homosexuals and aggression. He alleged that other clients complained to Darlene Harris. He further alleged that six defendants refused repeated requests to separate him from the assailant, while William Robinson failed to respond to yelling and commotion that Robinson allegedly had reason to believe involved an attack.

Although the court preferred more individualized allegations, it found the complaint plausible. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court had to accept plausible factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences for Daywitt. The court emphasized that whether the allegations would ultimately be proved was not being decided.

The court also rejected the defendants’ qualified-immunity argument at this stage. It held that Daywitt plausibly alleged a constitutional violation and that the general duty of officials to protect prisoners from violence by other prisoners was clearly established. The court stated that Daywitt did not need to identify an earlier case with exactly the same facts. It also noted that whether the claims would survive a later motion for summary judgment was a separate question.

As to negligence, the court held that the allegations also plausibly supported an inference of willful indifference. Daywitt alleged repeated complaints, warnings from other detainees, and defendants’ own observations of threatening conduct followed by a failure to act. The court therefore declined to apply official immunity at the pleading stage.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. It did not decide whether Daywitt would ultimately prove his claims or whether the defendants would be liable. The court separately ordered Daywitt to serve the Second Amended Complaint on Cheryl Floren within 14 days of the order. It stated that failure to do so would result in dismissal of Daywitt’s claims against Floren without prejudice for failure to prosecute.