Fredin v. Middlecamp

Background

The court issued one consolidated order addressing two related federal cases brought by Brock Fredin. Fredin proceeded without a lawyer. Lindsey Middlecamp was the defendant in Case No. 17-cv-3058. Grace Elizabeth Miller and Catherine Marie Schaefer were the defendants in Case No. 18-cv-466.

Middlecamp moved for summary judgment on Fredin’s defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Miller and Schaefer moved for summary judgment on Fredin’s remaining claims against them: defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, nonconsensual sexual solicitation, negligence, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. Summary judgment is a decision entered without a trial when the court finds that no genuine dispute over an important fact requires a trial and that the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Claims Against Middlecamp

Fredin’s defamation claim against Middlecamp focused on a February 22, 2017 Twitter post stating that a rape survivor had come forward and that Fredin remained free. The post included a redacted Facebook post by a woman identified in the opinion as J.K., who alleged that Fredin had raped her seven years earlier.

The court found no genuine dispute over whether the alleged rape survivor existed. It concluded that Fredin’s evidence—primarily emails about a separate effort to determine whether he was behind messages sent to Schaefer—did not support his claim that Middlecamp fabricated the rape allegation. The court also found that Middlecamp’s statement that a rape survivor had come forward and Fredin remained free was not false as stated.

The court determined that, even construing the post as republishing an allegation that Fredin committed rape, the subject was a matter of public concern because it addressed harassment and rape on a public Twitter account and appeared alongside a City Pages article about Fredin’s harassment of Miller and Schaefer. Because Fredin was a private person, presumed damages for a defamatory statement on a matter of public concern required proof of “actual malice”—knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for whether it was true. The court found no evidence creating a factual dispute about actual malice. It also found that Fredin had presented no evidence of reputational damages.

For the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court found that Fredin had not provided evidence showing that Middlecamp’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, intentional or reckless, or the cause of severe emotional distress. The court specifically noted that Fredin lacked medical documentation or testimony supporting causation and the severity of his distress. It therefore granted Middlecamp summary judgment on both claims.

Claims Against Miller and Schaefer

Fredin claimed that Miller and Schaefer made false statements to the City Pages reporter, including statements about Schaefer’s unwanted contacts and Miller’s sexually suggestive messages. The court found that the article was written by journalist Mike Mullen, not by Miller or Schaefer. It further found that the challenged statements were opinions, substantially true statements, or supportable interpretations of information in Schaefer’s state-court affidavit and court rulings. Fredin did not provide evidence sufficient to show that Miller or Schaefer directly made the statements to Mullen. The court also found that Fredin did not identify the alleged Twitter posts supporting another part of his defamation claim.

For the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, the court found that Fredin lacked sufficient evidence showing that Miller or Schaefer created the alleged online sexual profiles, coached false legal actions, or broadcast false claims. It also found that he lacked medical evidence of causation and severe distress. The court concluded that Miller and Schaefer were entitled to summary judgment on these claims.

The court granted summary judgment on Fredin’s nonconsensual sexual solicitation claims because he did not provide evidence that Miller or Schaefer used his personal information to solicit sexual acts. It granted summary judgment on his invasion-of-privacy claims because he did not provide evidence that they published or disseminated the alleged sexual advertisements.

The court also granted summary judgment on the abuse-of-process claims. It found that Fredin had not shown that Miller and Schaefer used legal proceedings to achieve results outside the scope of those proceedings or provided sufficient evidence of an improper purpose. The court granted summary judgment on the negligence claims because Fredin had not shown that Miller and Schaefer owed him a legal duty or that their actions proximately caused his alleged injuries. Finally, because all of the underlying tort claims failed, the court granted summary judgment on the civil-conspiracy claims as well.

Other Motions and Final Disposition

The court ruled on several related motions. It denied Fredin’s motion to strike in part and denied it as moot in part. The court considered Middlecamp’s electronically signed declaration because it included a statement that it was made under penalty of perjury. It did not consider J.K.’s declaration because it was unsworn and not notarized; the court treated the motion to strike as moot as to that declaration. The court denied Fredin’s October 13, 2020 motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, finding that the declarations were responsive to his arguments and did not violate the rule. It denied both motions to unseal documents, including the motion concerning Gordon Roy Parker’s letter, which remained sealed because the court found it unreliable and irrelevant and because it contained information about non-parties.

Judge Susan Richard Nelson granted Middlecamp’s summary judgment motion and granted Miller and Schaefer’s summary judgment motion. The order also denied or denied as moot Fredin’s related motions as specified above, and dismissed Fredin’s claims in both actions with prejudice. The court directed that judgment be entered.