Fredin v. Miller

Background

The court addressed two related federal cases in one consolidated order. Brock Fredin represented himself. The defendants were Lindsey Middlecamp in case 17-cv-3058, and Grace Miller and Catherine Schaefer in case 18-cv-466. Fredin sued over defendants’ alleged online statements and other conduct connected to harassment restraining orders and related state-court proceedings.

Against Middlecamp, Fredin asserted defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Against Miller and Schaefer, he asserted defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, nonconsensual sexual solicitation, invasion of privacy, negligence, and civil conspiracy. The court noted that some claims had previously been dismissed or limited, including Fredin’s abuse-of-process claim against Middlecamp.

Summary-judgment standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A party opposing summary judgment must present specific evidence showing a genuine dispute about an important fact; allegations, speculation, and conjecture are not enough.

Defamation claims

Fredin’s defamation claim against Middlecamp focused on a February 22, 2017 Twitter post stating that a rape survivor had come forward and that Fredin remained free, along with a redacted Facebook post. The court found no material factual dispute that the alleged rape survivor was a real person rather than a fabrication. It also found that the statement that Fredin “remains free” was true and that the post addressed a matter of public concern. Because Fredin offered no evidence of reputational damages and no evidence of actual malice—the required knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth—the court granted summary judgment to Middlecamp on the defamation claim.

Fredin also alleged that Miller and Schaefer made defamatory statements to a City Pages reporter. The court found that the article was written by journalist Mike Mullen, not by Miller or Schaefer, and that the statements could be traced to Schaefer’s state-court affidavit or an earlier Minnesota appellate decision. Fredin did not provide evidence creating a material factual dispute that Miller or Schaefer made the statements directly to Mullen or that the statements were false and defamatory. The court therefore granted summary judgment to Miller and Schaefer on the defamation claims. The court did not decide whether an absolute litigation privilege applied because that issue was unnecessary to the ruling.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

The court granted summary judgment to Middlecamp on Fredin’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Fredin relied on Middlecamp’s republication of the rape allegation, but the court found insufficient evidence that Middlecamp knew the allegation was false or acted recklessly. The court also found that Fredin provided no medical evidence or other sufficient evidence creating a factual dispute about causation or the severity of his emotional distress.

The court likewise granted summary judgment to Miller and Schaefer on their intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. Fredin did not provide sufficient evidence that they created online sexual profiles, coached false legal actions, or broadcast false claims. He also lacked sufficient evidence of causation and severe emotional distress.

Other claims against Miller and Schaefer

The court granted summary judgment on Fredin’s nonconsensual sexual-solicitation and invasion-of-privacy claims because he did not provide evidence that Miller or Schaefer used his personal information to create sexual advertisements or profiles.

The court granted summary judgment on the abuse-of-process claims because Fredin did not show that Miller or Schaefer used legal proceedings to accomplish an outcome outside those proceedings’ proper scope. The court also found that they lacked authority or control over the criminal investigation and prosecution.

The court granted summary judgment on the negligence claims because Fredin did not establish a legal duty of care or a breach. It found that the restraining orders and criminal conviction resulted from Fredin’s conduct and from independent decisions by prosecutors, a jury, and a judge. Finally, because Fredin’s underlying tort claims failed, the court granted summary judgment on his civil-conspiracy claims as well.

Related motions and disposition

The court denied in part and denied as moot in part Fredin’s motion to strike. It considered Middlecamp’s declaration but did not consider the declaration from the alleged rape survivor because that declaration was unsworn and lacked the required statement under penalty of perjury. The court denied Fredin’s October 13, 2020 motion for Rule 11 sanctions, finding that the challenged declarations responded to arguments Fredin had raised and did not violate Rule 11. The court denied both motions to unseal a letter from a non-party, finding the letter unreliable and irrelevant and allowing it to remain sealed.

The court granted Middlecamp’s summary-judgment motion and granted Miller and Schaefer’s summary-judgment motion. It dismissed Fredin’s claims in both actions with prejudice and directed that judgment be entered. Judge Susan Richard Nelson signed the order on November 13, 2020.