Fredin v. Middlecamp
- Susan Nelson
- 0:17-cv-03058
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 5
In Fredin v. Middlecamp, Judge Nelson denied Brock Fredin’s motion to disqualify her after finding no reasonable basis to question her impartiality.
Brock Fredin and the defendants in the three related cases: Lindsey Middlecamp, Grace Elizabeth Miller, Catherine Marie Schaefer, and Jamie Kreil.
What happened
In Fredin v. Middlecamp, Brock Fredin asked the court to remove Judge Susan Richard Nelson from three related cases. The request followed an order sanctioning Fredin for online websites and videos that the court found were intended to harass and intimidate defense lawyers and the court.
Fredin argued that Judge Nelson could not be impartial because she had previously worked at Robins Kaplan, the law firm representing defendant Jamie Kreil, and had allegedly worked with and mentored one of Kreil’s lawyers. He also pointed to rulings in Kreil’s favor. The court explained that disqualification is required only when a reasonable person would question the judge’s impartiality.
Judge Nelson ruled that Fredin had not met that burden and denied the motion to disqualify. She found that she had left Robins Kaplan in 2000, had no financial interest in the firm, and had not worked there at the same time as Kreil’s attorney. The court also declined a request by some defendants for $5,000 in attorneys’ fees.
The detailed version
- Fredin v. Middlecamp · No. 0:17-cv-03058
- Susan Nelson
- Dec. 18, 2020
Background
The order addresses Brock Fredin’s motion to disqualify Judge Susan Richard Nelson under 28 U.S.C. § 455 in three related cases. Fredin represented himself. The defendants were Lindsey Middlecamp, Grace Elizabeth Miller, Catherine Marie Schaefer, and Jamie Kreil.
The motion followed the court’s November 23, 2020 sanctions order. In that order, the court found that Fredin had created websites and videos disparaging defense counsel and a magistrate judge and had done so in a bad-faith effort to harass and intimidate the defendants and the court. The court imposed sanctions under its inherent power to address abuses of the judicial process, including an injunction requiring Fredin to remove the websites and videos.
Recusal standard
Section 455 requires a federal judge to disqualify herself when her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The test is objective: the question is whether a reasonable person who knew the circumstances would question the judge’s impartiality, even without proof of actual bias. A party seeking disqualification bears a substantial burden because judges are presumed to be impartial. The court stated that the same standard applies under the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.
Fredin’s arguments and the court’s analysis
Fredin primarily relied on Judge Nelson’s former relationship with Robins Kaplan, which represented Kreil. He argued that the court was interested in protecting and representing the firm and its attorneys. He also argued that recusal was required because Judge Nelson had previously worked with and mentored one of Kreil’s attorneys. In addition, Fredin suggested that rulings favoring Kreil showed partiality.
The court rejected these arguments. Judge Nelson stated that she joined the firm in 1984 and left in 2000 to take the federal bench, so she had no financial stake in the firm after 2000. She also stated that her time at the firm did not overlap with the time of Kreil’s attorney. The court therefore found no financial or personal interest that would cause a reasonable person to question its impartiality. It further explained that an adverse ruling, without a clear showing of bias or partiality, is not enough to require disqualification.
Disposition
The court held that neither Section 455 nor the judicial conduct rules required disqualification and stated that disqualification would be prohibited when the governing standards were not met. Judge Susan Richard Nelson denied Fredin’s Motion to Disqualify in all three listed cases.
Defendants Middlecamp, Miller, and Schaefer also requested $5,000 in attorneys’ fees for responding to the motion. The court declined to depart from the general rule that each side ordinarily pays its own attorneys’ fees for this motion, while warning that it would strongly consider future fee requests if Fredin generated additional motion practice in bad faith.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.