Tirado v. City of Minneapolis

Background

Linda Tirado, a freelance journalist, traveled to Minneapolis to cover the protests and unrest following George Floyd’s death while in Minneapolis Police Department custody. Tirado alleged that she was identifiable as press because she wore a reflective press credential, carried professional camera equipment, and wore protective equipment. Shortly after midnight on May 30, 2020, an MPD officer fired a 40mm foam bullet at her head while she was photographing police. The projectile struck her face, and Tirado alleged that she became permanently blind in her left eye.

Tirado brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute that allows claims against persons acting under state law for violations of constitutional rights. She alleged that the City of Minneapolis and Chief Medaria Arradondo were liable under the rule commonly called Monell for an unofficial custom of targeting journalists during the George Floyd protests. She also alleged that the City, Robert Kroll, and four unidentified MPD officers conspired to deprive journalists of constitutional rights. The opinion states that the City did not move to dismiss Tirado’s common-law battery claim.

Tirado identified multiple other alleged incidents involving MPD officers and journalists, including journalists being struck or shot with less-lethal projectiles, hit with a baton, threatened, or exposed to chemical irritants. She alleged that the City had notice of these incidents through news coverage, social-media monitoring, and direct outreach from media organizations. She also alleged that Kroll, the president of the police union representing MPD officers, communicated with senior MPD policymakers and had influence over MPD culture and policies.

Motions to Dismiss

The City moved to dismiss the Monell claims concerning alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Kroll and the City both moved to dismiss the civil-conspiracy claim. The court reviewed the motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough facts to make a claim legally plausible. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed them favorably to Tirado, but it did not accept unsupported legal conclusions as facts.

Municipal Liability

The court held that Tirado plausibly alleged an unofficial municipal custom. To state such a claim, she needed to allege a continuing and widespread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct, deliberate indifference or tacit authorization by city policymakers after notice of the misconduct, and injury caused by that custom.

The court rejected the City’s argument that only incidents involving the same type of projectile could be considered. It found sufficient similarities among the alleged incidents because the journalists were identifiable as press, were separated from protestors and at a distance from police, and were not alleged to be engaging in threatening or unlawful conduct. The court also concluded that the alleged incidents—occurring during the protests and including Tirado’s injury and conduct involving at least nine other journalists—were sufficiently numerous at the pleading stage to plausibly show a pattern.

The court further held that the limited period covered by the allegations did not require dismissal. Although the alleged conduct occurred during a single police operation connected to the protests, Tirado alleged that the City had notice of earlier incidents and could have changed MPD tactics before her injury. The court therefore found that she plausibly alleged deliberate indifference, meaning that the City allegedly knew of the violations and deliberately failed to take corrective action.

The court denied the City’s motion to dismiss Counts I, II, and III, which asserted the Monell-based claims involving the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Civil Conspiracy

The court also held that Tirado plausibly alleged a civil conspiracy under § 1983. Such a claim required allegations that the defendants agreed to deprive her of constitutional rights, that at least one conspirator committed an act advancing the conspiracy, and that the act injured her.

The court rejected Kroll’s argument that he could not be liable because he was sued individually rather than in an official capacity. Although private persons generally are not liable under § 1983, the court explained that a private person may be liable for conspiring with state officials if he was a willing participant. Tirado alleged that Kroll communicated with MPD policymakers, influenced MPD culture and policies, and acted on hostility toward the press.

The court acknowledged that the complaint did not describe the City’s response to Kroll’s communications. But it concluded that Kroll’s alleged influence, together with the alleged conduct of MPD officers, provided circumstantial facts supporting an inference of a shared understanding or “meeting of the minds.” The court stated that discovery was appropriate and noted that the claim could later be resolved at summary judgment if Tirado could not produce evidence of agreement or responsive conduct by the City or the unidentified officers.

The court found that Tirado also plausibly alleged an unlawful purpose, overt conduct by the unidentified officers, and resulting injury. It therefore denied both motions to dismiss Count IV, the civil-conspiracy claim.

Disposition

The order states that Kroll’s motion to dismiss was DENIED and that the City of Minneapolis and Medaria Arradondo’s motion to dismiss was DENIED. The decision allowed the specified claims to proceed to discovery. It did not determine ultimate liability or resolve the factual disputes.