League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund v. Simon

Background

The plaintiffs brought three constitutional challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Minnesota’s requirements for absentee ballots cast away from a designated polling place. Minnesota law generally required a witness to be a registered Minnesota voter, a notary public, or another person authorized to administer oaths. The witness also had to sign statements about how the ballot was displayed, marked, sealed, and, in some circumstances, how the voter established residence.

Count I challenged the requirements as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs alleged that voters who did not live with a qualified witness faced a choice between voting by absentee ballot and interacting with someone outside their household, creating a heightened risk of COVID-19 transmission. Count II was a facial challenge to the limits on who could serve as a witness, alleging that those limits burdened voters regardless of public-health conditions. Count III alleged that the registered-voter requirement violated equal protection by discriminating against non-citizens who could not register to vote in Minnesota.

The Republican National Committee and Republican Party of Minnesota, which had intervened in the case, moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which addresses failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Secretary of State Steve Simon did not respond or appear in connection with the motion.

Count I: Pandemic-related challenge

The court denied the motion insofar as it sought dismissal of Count I for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court explained that standing requires a concrete injury, a connection between that injury and the challenged conduct, and a likelihood that a favorable decision would remedy the injury. For a future injury, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the injury is certainly impending or that there is a substantial risk it will occur.

The court found that the amended complaint plausibly alleged that plaintiff Isabel Bethke faced a substantial risk of injury in connection with the November 2021 elections. Bethke was alleged to be a registered St. Paul voter, had previously experienced difficulty finding a witness for an absentee ballot, did not share a household with a qualified witness, and had concerns about COVID-19 exposure. The court also found that the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund plausibly alleged an organizational injury because it expected to divert resources to educate voters about the witness requirement. The court acknowledged that future pandemic conditions were uncertain but concluded that uncertainty did not prevent the alleged future injury from being plausible.

Count II: Facial challenge to witness qualifications

The court granted the motion insofar as it sought dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim. A facial challenge seeks to invalidate a law in all its applications. Applying Eighth Circuit precedent, particularly Brakebill v. Jaeger, the court held that allegations showing excessive burdens on some voters based on their individual circumstances could not plausibly support a facial challenge seeking statewide relief for all voters.

The plaintiffs had alleged generally that the witness restrictions burdened Minnesota voters, but their arguments focused on people in particular circumstances, such as voters living outside Minnesota or in mixed-citizenship households. The court concluded that this theory was insufficient under the controlling precedent. It also rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt at the hearing to recast Count II as an as-applied challenge because the amended complaint sought only facial relief, the argument was raised too late, and the plaintiffs had not shown that such a challenge should proceed after the facial challenge failed. The order stated that Count II was dismissed with prejudice.

Count III: Citizenship-based equal-protection challenge

The court granted the motion insofar as it sought dismissal of Count III for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed Count III without prejudice. The plaintiffs sought to assert the equal-protection rights of non-citizens, but no non-citizen was a plaintiff.

The court applied the doctrine of third-party standing, which generally prevents a litigant from asserting someone else’s legal rights. An exception requires a sufficiently close relationship with the person whose rights are being asserted and a real obstacle preventing that person from protecting their own interests. The court found that Bethke had not identified a sufficient obstacle preventing her husband from asserting his own rights. His non-citizenship and pending immigration applications, without more specific allegations of harm from bringing a lawsuit, were not enough. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ asserted relationship with unidentified, future non-citizen witnesses was insufficient and that they had not shown those witnesses faced a hindrance to bringing their own claims.

Disposition

The court ordered that the intervenors’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part: dismissal of Count I for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was denied; dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim was granted, and Count II was dismissed with prejudice; and dismissal of Count III for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was granted, and Count III was dismissed without prejudice.