Goyette v. City of Minneapolis

Background

The plaintiffs were journalists, photographers, other members of the press, and the Communications Workers of America, an international labor union representing news media workers. They brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against people acting under state law for violating constitutional rights. The lawsuit was a proposed class action concerning police conduct toward the press during protests in Minnesota after George Floyd’s death.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Minneapolis Police Department and Minnesota State Patrol worked together during the protests, using tactics that included physical force, projectiles, tear gas, arrests, and orders that impeded news gathering. Jared Goyette alleged that a projectile struck him while he was covering the protests. The plaintiffs also alleged that Robert Kroll, a Minneapolis police lieutenant and president of the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis, had substantial influence over police policies and practices and participated in a broader agreement involving state and city officials.

State Defendants’ Motion

Commissioner John Harrington and Colonel Matthew Langer, identified as the state defendants, moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, while Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The state defendants argued, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that official-capacity damages claims were barred by sovereign immunity, that the officials were protected by qualified immunity, and that the complaint did not adequately allege personal involvement or several specific claims.

The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged standing. It found that the alleged repeated incidents involving the press and the continuing effect on the press’s First Amendment rights made the claimed future harm non-speculative. The court also held that the Communications Workers of America plausibly alleged organizational standing because its members included or were similarly situated to individual plaintiffs with standing, the union’s purpose related to protecting its members, and the requested declaratory and injunctive relief did not require each member to participate individually.

The court held that damages could not be recovered from Harrington and Langer in their official capacities because state officials are protected from such damages claims by sovereign immunity. It also held that the complaint plausibly alleged the officials’ personal involvement. The allegations described Harrington’s leadership of the Multi-Agency Command Center and Langer’s supervisory authority over the Minnesota State Patrol and their alleged roles in creating, applying, or interpreting policies connected to the challenged conduct.

The court declined to dismiss the individual-capacity claims based on qualified immunity at this stage. It concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged that the state defendants had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct toward the press and were deliberately indifferent to that conduct. The court noted that further discovery could show that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, but that entitlement was not established on the face of the complaint.

Specific Claims

The court granted the state defendants’ motion as to the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due-process claim because the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to federal government action, and the complaint did not allege that a federal actor violated the plaintiffs’ rights. The court denied the motion as to the Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claim, reasoning that the plaintiffs could plead alternative constitutional theories.

The court denied the state defendants’ motion as to the civil-conspiracy claim. It held that the allegations about coordinated police operations, the Multi-Agency Command Center, shared crowd-control methods, and the defendants’ alleged agreement plausibly suggested a meeting of the minds and an overt act that injured the plaintiffs. The court also denied the motion as to the failure-to-intervene claim, finding that the complaint plausibly alleged that the state defendants knew of prior violations, had authority to prevent similar conduct, and failed to do so.

Kroll’s Motion

Kroll moved to dismiss the civil-conspiracy claim against him, arguing that he was a private actor and could not be liable under § 1983. The court explained that a private actor may be liable when he willfully participates in a conspiracy with state officials. It found the allegations about Kroll’s influence over Minneapolis police policies, communications with policymakers, public statements, and advocacy for more arrests, tear gas, and less-lethal ammunition sufficient to plausibly allege that he acted jointly with state and city defendants to pursue an unlawful objective.

Disposition

The court granted the state defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due-process claim and denied it in all other respects. The court denied Kroll’s motion to dismiss. The court did not address the City defendants’ request for dismissal because they had submitted a memorandum rather than a motion. This order resolved the pleading-stage motions; it did not finally decide whether the alleged constitutional violations occurred.