Kaplan v. Harrington

Background

Zoe Kaplan, Jack Flom, and Samira Hassan alleged that they peacefully participated in protests following the killing of Daunte Wright in April 2021. They claimed that unidentified law-enforcement officers used excessive force, arrested them without probable cause, and held them for extended periods. They asserted claims under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, civil conspiracy and failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Minnesota common-law false imprisonment. They also sought to represent a proposed class of similarly treated protesters.

The named defendants were former Minnesota Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Commissioner Sarah Strommen, Minnesota State Patrol Colonel Matthew Langer, former Hennepin County Sheriff David Hutchinson, and John Does 1–10. Plaintiffs sued each defendant in both official and individual capacities. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state plausible claims.

Standing and official-capacity claims

The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to seek injunctive relief against the State Defendants because they alleged that they intended to participate in future protests and could face future injury. The court therefore found that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.

The court concluded, however, that the official-capacity claims depended on the plaintiffs’ theories that the defendants had conspired to violate protesters’ rights and retaliated against them. The complaint did not plausibly allege an agreement among the defendants to violate constitutional rights, an overt act by the named defendants in furtherance of such an agreement, or facts showing that the defendants acted with retaliatory intent. The court therefore dismissed with prejudice all official-capacity claims against Harrington, Strommen, and Langer, and dismissed with prejudice Hutchinson’s official-capacity claims.

Individual-capacity claims

The court dismissed with prejudice the individual-capacity conspiracy and retaliation claims against all defendants. It found that the existence of Operation Safety Net and an operations plan mentioning mass arrests did not, without more, show an agreement to arrest protesters without probable cause. The arrest of a CNN journalist who was later released also did not establish a predetermined plan to use false probable-cause statements.

The individual-capacity claims against Strommen were dismissed with prejudice because the complaint did not allege her personal involvement, presence at the protest, direction of the response, or involvement by Department of Natural Resources officers in the alleged violations. The court also found no specific injuries traceable to a Department of Natural Resources officer.

The court analyzed the claims against Hutchinson, Harrington, and Langer largely under supervisory-liability principles. A supervisor must generally have been personally involved or must have failed to train or supervise an offending officer after being placed on notice of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. The court found that the complaint did not adequately allege such notice or a deficient training program. It also concluded that video evidence cast doubt on the assertion that the arrests of Kaplan and Flom lacked probable cause. The First and Fourth Amendment claims against Harrington and Langer were dismissed with prejudice. The comparable claims against Hutchinson were dismissed without prejudice because of his alleged role as the on-site commander and the possibility that more specific allegations could be made about detention-related conduct under his command.

The court dismissed the detention-related claims against all defendants. It found no specific facts showing that any defendant knew of a pattern of unjustified prolonged detention, and noted that the time between the arrests and probable-cause determinations was under 48 hours, which the court described as presumptively reasonable.

The failure-to-intervene claims were dismissed because the complaint did not plausibly allege that any defendant was physically present and had an opportunity to stop a specific use of excessive force. The false-imprisonment claims were also dismissed because the named defendants were not alleged to have arrested the plaintiffs, and the complaint did not plausibly show that the arrests lacked probable cause.

John Doe defendants and disposition

The court dismissed all claims against John Does 1–10 without prejudice. More than 90 days had passed, the defendants had not been identified or served, and the complaint did not provide enough specific information to identify them through limited discovery.

The order granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. It dismissed the action with prejudice as to Strommen, Harrington, and Langer; dismissed Hutchinson in his official capacity with prejudice; dismissed Hutchinson in his individual capacity without prejudice; and dismissed the claims against John Does 1–10 without prejudice. Judge John R. Tunheim entered judgment accordingly.