Said v. Mayo Clinic

Background

Sameh Mahmoud Mohamed Said, a cardiovascular surgeon, sued his former employer, Mayo Clinic, and his former supervisor, Joseph Albert Dearani, MD. Said alleged that Mayo took adverse employment actions against him because of his race, religion, and national origin. His twelve-count amended complaint also asserted retaliation claims and state-law claims for tortious interference with future employment, defamation, invasion of privacy, and conversion.

Said began working for Mayo in July 2015 as a Senior Associate Consultant. The court described evidence of mostly positive clinical and surgical performance, along with concerns about interpersonal conduct, professionalism, workload, and his pursuit of romantic relationships with female colleagues. Mayo delayed consideration of his promotion to Consultant several times. After another employee complained in October 2018 about unwelcome romantic conduct, Mayo placed Said on administrative leave and investigated. The investigation recommended termination, but Said resigned on December 3, 2018, before the termination review committee met. He later accepted employment with the University of Minnesota.

Summary-judgment standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the evidence and reasonable inferences in Said’s favor as the nonmoving party.

Discrimination claims

Counts I through VI alleged race, religion, and national-origin discrimination under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The court held that Said had not identified direct evidence of discrimination. In particular, it found that the statement that Said was “not Mayo material” was facially and contextually neutral and was not linked to any later adverse employment action.

The court therefore applied the burden-shifting framework used for discrimination claims. Said had to show facts supporting an inference of discrimination, including evidence of a similarly situated employee treated more favorably. He relied primarily on Simon Maltais, MD, a white physician of Canadian descent. The court found that Maltais was not a legally sufficient comparator because his misconduct was not of comparable seriousness to Said’s repeated pursuit of unwelcome romantic relationships after being told to stop. The court also found that Mayo’s treatment of Maltais was not materially different: Mayo extended Maltais only until the end of 2018 without the possibility of promotion, while it continued to consider Said for promotion until the later complaint and investigation.

The court further held that Said had not shown that Mayo’s stated reasons—complaints about unwelcome advances and other misconduct—were a pretext for discrimination. His strong surgical performance, publications, and clinical outcomes did not by themselves create a genuine dispute about pretext. The court granted summary judgment to Mayo on Counts I through VI. It did not need to decide Mayo’s alternative arguments concerning the timeliness of some claims.

Minnesota Human Rights Act reprisal claim

Count VII alleged that Mayo retaliated against Said under the Minnesota Human Rights Act after his lawyer sent an October 2018 letter asserting discrimination. The court found no evidence of a causal connection between that protected activity and the adverse actions. Mayo had begun investigating Said and placed him on leave before the discrimination complaint was made, and the evidence supporting the investigation was not genuinely disputed.

The court also held that Minnesota law immunized Mayo from liability for reporting Said’s resignation to the Minnesota Board of Medical Practice because the report fell within statutory reporting and immunity provisions. The opinion therefore rejected the reprisal claim.

Minnesota Whistleblower Act claim

Count VIII alleged retaliation under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. Said relied on two theories: retaliation for the discrimination complaint in his lawyer’s letter and retaliation for a complaint by his medical secretary, Rachael Johnson, alleging that Dearani improperly discussed Said’s medical information with the surgeon who treated his injured hand.

The court rejected the first theory for the same reasons it rejected the Minnesota Human Rights Act reprisal claim and also noted that the Minnesota Human Rights Act’s exclusive-remedy provision preempted the theory. Regarding the second theory, the court assumed, without deciding, that Johnson’s complaint could be protected activity attributable to Said. It nevertheless found no reasonable basis for causation because Mayo had planned coaching before the complaint, had already investigated other concerns about Said, and later misconduct—including the complaint involving R.R.—undermined any causal inference. The court rejected both theories.

Defamation claim

For Count X, the court granted summary judgment on each statement identified in the amended complaint, but for differing reasons. Some statements were not pleaded with enough detail under Minnesota law because the complaint did not identify, among other things, to whom or where the statements were made. Details supplied later in summary-judgment materials could not expand the pleaded claim.

Other statements were supported only by hearsay, and Said did not show how the evidence could be presented in admissible form. The court also found that Said had no evidence supporting certain alleged statements that he was on administrative leave or would soon be terminated. It noted that the administrative-leave statement was true and that the evidence did not establish the alleged statement about his impending termination.

Tortious interference with future employment

For Count IX, the court held that Said had not shown damages because he was offered and accepted the University of Minnesota position and began working there. His theory that his start date was delayed relied on inadmissible hearsay, and a University of Minnesota doctor denied that the start date was delayed because of Mayo-related issues. The court also found that Said had identified no independently tortious or unlawful act supporting the claim.

Invasion of privacy

For Count XI, Said alleged that Dearani and Renee Jones retrieved a notebook from his Mayo desk, photographed journal pages, and shared the images during Mayo’s investigation. The court held that retrieving and examining the notebook was not highly offensive as required for an intrusion-upon-seclusion claim. It emphasized that the desk was Mayo’s property, there was no evidence it was locked, the notebook was relevant to the investigation, and Said had shown the notebook to the employee whose complaint prompted the investigation.

The court also rejected the publication-of-private-facts claim. Minnesota law requires publicity to the public at large or to so many people that the information is substantially certain to become public. Said did not know who had seen the images or whether they had been shared outside the investigation, so he could not establish that requirement.

Conversion claim

For Count XII, Said claimed that Mayo converted an article he had co-authored by publishing it without crediting him. The court held that he had not shown deprivation of a property interest. He did not claim that Mayo prevented him from possessing or using the article, and he cited no authority establishing that publication without attribution was conversion. The court also noted that Said had signed an intellectual-property agreement assigning Mayo rights in works of authorship meeting specified conditions, and he identified no evidence or authority showing that the agreement did not control.

Disposition

The court ordered that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted and that the action be dismissed with prejudice. Judge Eric C. Tostrud directed that judgment be entered accordingly.