Turner v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator

Background

Derrick Devon Turner alleged that the Union, Otis Elevator, and TK Elevator discriminated against him because he is Black. He alleged that the Union placed less-experienced white applicants ahead of him for job placements, that Otis withdrew an initial job offer after employees commented that he was Black, and that the Union later required him to accept another Otis placement or risk removal from the apprenticeship program.

Turner also alleged repeated verbal abuse and racially offensive conduct while working at TK Elevator and Otis Elevator. The allegations included a racial slur, a comment about making nooses, repeated insults, threats of physical violence, unsafe work assignments, and the failure of Otis and the Union to take remedial action after his complaints. Otis later terminated him, and his participation in the apprenticeship program was also terminated.

The amended complaint asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal law prohibiting employment discrimination; Section 1981, which addresses race discrimination in contracts; the Minnesota Human Rights Act; federal workplace-safety law; Minnesota workplace-safety law; and Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act. The Union moved to dismiss all five counts alleged against it. Otis filed a partial motion to dismiss and asked to stay, or postpone, the deadline for answering the complaint.

Legal standard

The court evaluated the dismissal requests under Rule 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true, viewed them in Turner’s favor, and did not weigh competing evidence. A claim could proceed if the allegations made the requested relief plausible rather than merely speculative.

The Union’s arguments

The Union argued that it was the wrong defendant because a separate Joint Apprenticeship Committee administered the apprenticeship program and Turner was not a Union member. The court rejected that argument at the dismissal stage. Turner alleged that he joined the Union’s apprenticeship program, received job placements and guidance from the Union, reported problems to Union representatives, and was told he could be removed from the Union if he did not accept the Otis placement. Those allegations left factual questions about the Union’s responsibility and its relationship with the Joint Apprenticeship Committee.

The Union also argued that Turner had to allege a breach of the duty of fair representation under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court rejected that argument because Turner was alleging direct race discrimination by the Union, not an unfair-representation claim based on the Union’s failure to handle his grievances.

Title VII claims

The court denied the Union’s request to dismiss Turner’s Title VII race-discrimination claim. Turner alleged that he was qualified, was treated differently from less-experienced white colleagues, and was removed from the program because of his race. The court also rejected the Union’s arguments that the claim was untimely or that Turner had failed to complete the required administrative process before suing.

The court denied both defendants’ requests to dismiss Turner’s race-based harassment claims. Against Otis, Turner plausibly alleged a hostile work environment based on the noose comment, repeated insults, and threat of physical violence. Against the Union, Turner plausibly alleged that Union representatives knew about the harassment, required him to continue working for Otis, and failed to take remedial action.

The court also denied the Union’s request to dismiss Turner’s Title VII retaliation claim. Turner alleged that he complained about race discrimination and harassment and was then removed from the Union’s apprenticeship program because of those complaints.

Section 1981 claims

The court allowed Turner’s Section 1981 discrimination claim against the Union to proceed. His allegations that the Union treated him differently from white colleagues and removed him from its membership because of his race were sufficient at the pleading stage.

The court granted Otis’s motion to dismiss Turner’s Section 1981 failure-to-hire claim. Turner did not allege facts showing that the job opportunity remained available or was given to another person with comparable qualifications who was of a different race.

Minnesota Human Rights Act and safety claims

The court rejected the Union’s argument that Section 301 preempted, or displaced, Turner’s Minnesota Human Rights Act claims. It also found no indication that Turner had abandoned those claims. The opinion states that the court denied the Union’s and Otis’s motions to dismiss the Minnesota Human Rights Act claims.

The court granted the Union’s motion to dismiss Turner’s Minnesota workplace-safety claim because he voluntarily dismissed or abandoned it by failing to defend it in his opposition brief. The opinion also explains that federal workplace-safety law does not provide a private lawsuit for the retaliation claim at issue and states that Count IV should be dismissed as to Otis because Turner agreed to that dismissal. However, the numbered final order expressly lists Count IV as granted only as to the Union and does not separately state Otis’s Count IV disposition.

Order

The court ordered that the Union’s motion to dismiss was denied as to Counts I, II, and III and granted as to Counts IV and V. Otis’s partial motion to dismiss was denied as to Count I and granted as to the failure-to-hire claim in Count II. The court also granted Otis’s motion to stay the answer deadline and gave the defendants 14 days after the order to answer the amended complaint.