Brown v. American Federation of State

Background

The plaintiffs were current and former employees of various Minnesota state agencies. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, they were required to pay “fair-share” or “agency” fees to unions even though they refused to join the unions. The plaintiffs brought two proposed class actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, seeking repayment of fair-share fees paid before Janus.

The defendants were the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council No. 5, AFL-CIO, and the Minnesota Association of Professional Employees. Both unions moved to dismiss.

Issue and analysis

The unions argued that private actors may assert a good-faith defense to liability under Section 1983 when they relied on a state statute and Supreme Court precedent that authorized their conduct. The unions relied on the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act and more than 40 years of Supreme Court precedent, including Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which had permitted public-sector fair-share fees. In Janus, the Supreme Court later held that such arrangements violated employees’ First Amendment rights.

The court explained that, although Section 1983’s text does not expressly provide a good-faith defense, the Supreme Court has recognized defenses to Section 1983 claims when they are supported by common-law history and strong policy reasons. The court also discussed Supreme Court decisions stating that private defendants may have an affirmative defense based on good faith, even though private actors cannot use the same qualified immunity available to government officials.

The court held that private actors who act in good-faith reliance on a state statute and Supreme Court precedent holding that statute constitutional have an affirmative defense to Section 1983 liability. It found that the unions collected the fees as authorized by Minnesota law and supported by Abood and the precedent that followed it. Because the plaintiffs did not allege that the unions acted with malice, knew the Minnesota law was unconstitutional, or otherwise acted in bad faith, the defense was established on the face of the complaints.

The plaintiffs argued that the defense conflicted with Supreme Court decisions requiring new legal rules to apply retroactively. The court rejected that argument, explaining that the good-faith defense was an independent legal basis for denying relief rather than an improper exception to retroactivity. The court assumed, without deciding, that Janus applied retroactively.

Disposition

Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient claim, the court concluded that the good-faith defense barred the plaintiffs’ claims on the face of the complaints. It granted the unions’ motions to dismiss in both related cases and ordered judgment entered accordingly. The opinion does not state whether the dismissals were with or without prejudice.