Norgren v. Minnesota Department of Human Services

Background

Joseph Norgren alleged that he worked for the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) for 27 years as a security counselor at the Minnesota Security Hospital. He alleged that, in October 2018, a night-shift supervisor asked how many genders exist. Norgren responded that there are two genders and sexes, and the supervisor became angry and said Norgren could be fired for the way he thought and spoke.

In 2020, DHS required employees to complete training units titled “How to be Anti-Racist” and “Understanding Gender Identity and Expression: Moving Beyond the Binary.” Norgren opposed the anti-racism training because he equated it with Critical Race Theory, which he viewed as inconsistent with the traditional view of equality under Title VII. He opposed the gender-identity training because he viewed nonbinary gender as contrary to his sincerely held religious belief. He requested a religious exemption from the gender-identity training, but DHS denied the request and told him there was no appeal.

Norgren had already notified his supervisor and human-resources staff on October 6, 2020, that he planned to retire on January 6, 2021. After the exemption request was denied, he wrote that the workplace had become hostile and uncomfortable and that he felt forced to retire prematurely. He later filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then brought this lawsuit.

Claims and analysis

Norgren asserted racial and religious discrimination and retaliation claims against DHS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He also asserted racial discrimination and reprisal claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Against Commissioner Jodi Harpstead in her individual capacity, he asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation under the First Amendment and compelled speech.

Title VII race discrimination

The court dismissed Count I. Norgren alleged that DHS created a hostile work environment and constructively discharged him because he opposed the anti-racism training. Constructive discharge means working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign, together with an employer intent to force the employee to quit. The court held that requiring all employees to complete diversity training and receiving communications that conflicted with Norgren’s views did not plausibly establish such conditions or an intent to force him to resign.

The court also held that Norgren did not allege facts showing that similarly situated employees outside his protected class were treated differently. The amended complaint did not explain how he was treated after opposing the training or compare that treatment with employees who made similar objections.

Title VII religious discrimination

The court dismissed Count II. It held that the alleged 2018 conversation was an isolated remark occurring roughly two years before Norgren ended his employment and did not plausibly establish working conditions that would have compelled a reasonable employee to resign. The court also held that the denial of the training exemption could not have caused the alleged constructive discharge because Norgren had submitted his retirement notice three weeks before DHS denied the exemption request.

Norgren also did not allege that employees outside his protected class who sought an exemption were treated differently or provide other facts supporting an inference of religious discrimination.

Title VII retaliation

The court dismissed Count III. Norgren claimed that DHS retaliated against him for opposing the training, unequal treatment of employees seeking exemptions, and the threat of termination for his religious beliefs. The court held that attending across-the-board diversity training was not itself opposition to a practice prohibited by Title VII, and that the amended complaint did not allege facts showing he had objected to the alleged unequal treatment or threat of termination. The court further held that he did not plausibly allege a materially adverse action because the complaint did not adequately allege constructive discharge.

Section 1983 claims against Commissioner Harpstead

The court dismissed Count IV for several independent reasons. First, § 1983 does not impose liability on a government official merely because subordinates allegedly acted unlawfully. The plaintiff must allege that the official personally violated the Constitution. The court found no allegations that Commissioner Harpstead personally interacted with Norgren or was personally involved in his employment. Her email urging employees to focus on the training and “brave conversations” did not plausibly establish unconstitutional conduct.

Second, Norgren did not plausibly allege First Amendment retaliation. He did not adequately allege constructive discharge or personal conduct by Harpstead aimed at deterring his First Amendment activity.

Third, Norgren did not plausibly allege compelled speech. Although he alleged that the anti-racism training required him to admit, confess, or refrain from using certain language, he did not allege facts showing that employees had to make or refrain from making particular statements to complete the training or avoid discipline.

Finally, the court held that qualified immunity independently protected Harpstead. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from personal liability unless their conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time. The court found no controlling cases with similar facts that would have put Harpstead on notice that overseeing agency-wide anti-racism and gender-identity training violated an employee’s First Amendment rights.

Minnesota Human Rights Act claims

The court dismissed Counts V and VI without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal-court jurisdiction over state-law claims against nonconsenting states and state agencies. Norgren agreed that the court lacked jurisdiction and that dismissal should be without prejudice, but he asked the court to state that the claims were tolled for statute-of-limitations purposes. The court declined to address tolling or other limitations issues because it lacked jurisdiction.

Disposition

Judge Ann D. Montgomery granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Counts I through IV were dismissed with prejudice, and Counts V and VI were dismissed without prejudice. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.