Brennan v. Minnesota Department of Human Services

Background

Catherine Brennan alleged that the defendants violated her federal constitutional rights and committed medical malpractice under Minnesota law in connection with her 2019 civil commitment. She sought damages, expungement of prior commitment-related proceedings, relief concerning possible future commitment proceedings, and attorney’s fees. After earlier dismissals and rulings, three defendants remained: Cass County Health, Human and Veteran Services (the Department); Marsha McMillen, a Cass County social worker sued in her official capacity; and PSJ Acquisition, LLC, doing business as Prairie St. John’s Hospital.

The Department and McMillen moved to dismiss Brennan’s amended complaint on jurisdictional and merits grounds. PSJ moved for summary judgment on Brennan’s medical-malpractice claim, arguing that she failed to comply with North Dakota’s medical-malpractice expert-disclosure statute. The opinion also addressed Dr. David Anderholm’s motion to dismiss.

Claims Against the Department and McMillen

The court held that Brennan’s claims against the Department and McMillen were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine generally prevents a federal district court from acting as an appeals court over a state-court judgment. The court explained that the doctrine applies when a state-court loser complains of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and asks the federal court to overturn that judgment.

The court found that Brennan’s only discernable claim against these defendants was a claim for wrongful confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Brennan alleged that McMillen filed the initial petition for judicial commitment and that the resulting commitment orders were unlawfully obtained without following Minnesota’s statutory requirements. The court concluded that these allegations challenged the correctness of the state court’s commitment decisions rather than alleging that the defendants independently violated Brennan’s rights through conduct in the state-court proceeding. Her request to expunge the prior commitment proceedings also supported the conclusion that she was seeking to undo the state-court orders.

The court rejected Brennan’s argument that she lacked a meaningful opportunity to defend herself in state court because she had not pleaded a procedural due-process claim or facts supporting that theory. It also distinguished a prior appellate decision because, in that case, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants independently violated their federal rights during the state-court process. The court said Brennan had not made comparable allegations.

The court therefore granted the Department and McMillen’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed Brennan’s claims against them without prejudice. The court additionally stated that, if the jurisdictional doctrine did not apply, the wrongful-confinement claim would be barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey. It also identified alternative problems: the Department was not an entity subject to suit under Minnesota law; McMillen would have absolute immunity for initiating the commitment proceedings in the relevant role; and Brennan had not plausibly alleged a county policy or custom supporting an official-capacity claim.

Medical-Malpractice Claim Against PSJ

The court granted PSJ’s motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is warranted when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

The court applied Minnesota’s choice-of-law rules and determined that North Dakota’s expert-affidavit statute governed Brennan’s malpractice claim against PSJ. The North Dakota statute required a plaintiff to serve, within three months after starting the action, an affidavit containing an admissible expert opinion supporting a preliminary showing of professional negligence. The statute also required the affidavit to identify the expert, the expert’s business address and field, and a brief summary of the opinion’s basis.

The court found that Minnesota and North Dakota law conflicted on the substance and timing of the required expert support. Both states had significant connections to the dispute, but North Dakota’s connections were stronger because PSJ was located there and the alleged wrongful treatment occurred there. The court also found that North Dakota had the stronger governmental interest in regulating its health-care system and addressing malpractice claims involving treatment in North Dakota.

Brennan had attached an attorney-signed Minnesota affidavit of expert review to her original complaint. But the record did not show that she served or filed the separate affidavit required by North Dakota law, and she had not requested an extension before the three-month period expired. Brennan did not argue that she had complied with the North Dakota requirement. The court therefore granted PSJ’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Brennan’s medical-malpractice claim against PSJ without prejudice.

Other Motion and Disposition

Because of a stipulation and related order, the court denied Dr. David Anderholm’s motion to dismiss as moot.

Judge Eric C. Tostrud ordered judgment to be entered accordingly. The order granted the Department and McMillen’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, dismissed Brennan’s claims against them without prejudice, granted PSJ’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed Count 3 without prejudice, and denied Dr. Anderholm’s motion to dismiss as moot.