Dane P. v. Kijakazi

Background

The Social Security Administration denied Dane P.’s applications for Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits. He alleged that he became disabled because of the amputation of his left hand. After a hearing at which Dane P. testified with an attorney, an administrative law judge found that he had severe impairments consisting of morbid obesity and left-hand amputation. The judge determined that these impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment.

The administrative law judge found that Dane P. had the residual functional capacity—the most he could still do despite his impairments—to perform medium work with physical and environmental restrictions. The restrictions included a finding that he would perform a job 20 percent slower than an average employee. Although this capacity prevented him from returning to his past work as a bakery helper, material handler, or cashier, the judge found that other jobs existed that he could perform. The judge therefore concluded that he was not disabled, and the Appeals Council declined further review.

Issue

Dane P. argued that the finding that he would work 20 percent slower than average was unsupported by substantial evidence and that the administrative law judge did not explain how she chose that particular reduction in pace.

Analysis

The court reviewed the agency’s decision to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The court explained that the administrative law judge—not a medical expert—is responsible for determining residual functional capacity.

No medical opinion in the record identified a limitation on the pace at which Dane P. could work. The court acknowledged that the 20-percent pace restriction was more restrictive than the opinions of the medical experts, but found that the restriction benefited Dane P. The administrative law judge had partially credited his testimony about difficulty performing certain daily tasks but found that his statements about the severity of his limitations were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence. That other evidence included his ability to manage on his own and his successful adaptation to a prosthesis.

The court also found that the administrative law judge explained why she included some pace reduction in the residual functional capacity. She concluded that some reduction was justified, while rejecting the more extreme limitations described in Dane P.’s testimony. The court held that the administrative law judge was not required to adopt every limitation proposed by expert reviewers and that the residual functional capacity was supported by substantial evidence.

Disposition

The court denied Dane P.’s motion for judgment, granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the matter with prejudice. Judge Eric C. Tostrud directed that judgment be entered accordingly.