Kuklenski v. Medtronic USA, Inc.

Background

Jan Kuklenski filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which allows a court to correct limited errors or consider newly discovered evidence shortly after judgment. She asked the court to alter or amend its judgment granting Medtronic USA, Inc. summary judgment on Counts III and VI of her complaint. In the alternative, she asked the court to certify to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of what “works in Minnesota” means under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.

The court also noted that Kuklenski filed a memorandum supporting her motion but did not file a separate motion as required by a local rule. The court excused that filing violation because of the case’s post-judgment setting and extensive prior motion practice.

Arguments and analysis

Kuklenski argued that she could not physically work in Minnesota during the COVID-19 pandemic and related periods, and therefore her Minnesota Human Rights Act protections should not depend on physical presence in Minnesota. She also argued that the summary-judgment decision departed from an approach based on contacts with Minnesota. The court said these arguments, facts, and authorities had already been considered in its earlier summary-judgment decision.

Kuklenski further argued that Medtronic should not have been allowed to seek summary judgment on grounds and evidence she said had already been rejected when the court denied Medtronic’s motion to dismiss. The court disagreed, explaining that the factual showing was different. Her complaint had alleged that she was physically present in Minnesota for work 20 percent of the time during 22 years of employment, and that allegation had been accepted as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage. At summary judgment, however, it was undisputed that she had not been physically present in Minnesota for work after February 2020.

The court also rejected Kuklenski’s reliance on the law-of-the-case doctrine, which generally promotes consistency with decisions made earlier in the same case. The court explained that the doctrine applies to final orders, not interlocutory orders, and that denying the motion to dismiss had not finally decided whether Kuklenski had statutory standing under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.

Kuklenski argued that the judgment created a new legal rule without adequate notice and caused a manifest injustice. The court disagreed, noting that she had previously been warned about concerns with treating the issue as one based on contacts with Minnesota rather than statutory interpretation. The court also said the meaning of “works in this state” remained an issue for summary judgment and that applying the statute’s plain language did not create a manifest injustice. The opinion states that Kuklenski brought the case in Minnesota solely under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and declined to bring federal-law or Michigan Civil Rights Act claims.

Certification request and disposition

The court denied the alternative request to certify the statutory-interpretation question to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Kuklenski had not requested certification during the motion-to-dismiss or summary-judgment stages. The court stated that requesting certification after an adverse judgment is discouraged and that this was not the rare case in which post-judgment certification was warranted. It concluded that Minnesota’s rules of statutory interpretation provided a sufficient basis for deciding the question without certification.

Judge Eric C. Tostrud ordered that Kuklenski’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment was DENIED and that her Motion to Certify a Question to the Minnesota Supreme Court was DENIED. The earlier judgment granting Medtronic summary judgment remained in place.