Rud v. Johnston

Background

The plaintiffs are people civilly committed under Minnesota law to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). They alleged that they had been approved for transfer from a more secure MSOP facility to Community Preparation Services (CPS), a lower-security facility intended to help patients develop skills for eventual reintegration into the community. The plaintiffs alleged that delays in transferring them made treatment progress and eventual discharge virtually impossible, although the opinion states that Minnesota law does not require CPS residence for provisional discharge or discharge.

All named plaintiffs had received approval for transfer from the Special Review Board and the Commitment Appeal Panel. The opinion states that four plaintiffs were transferred after waiting approximately seven to ten months, while two remained on the transfer list after their transfer orders were approved in October 2023. As of January 2024, 16 patients were waiting for transfer.

The plaintiffs alleged substantive and procedural due-process violations against Nancy Johnston, the MSOP executive director, and Jodi Harpstead, the Minnesota Department of Human Services commissioner. They sued both officials in their official and individual capacities and renewed a request for a peremptory writ of mandamus, which is a court order requiring an official to perform a legal duty without first giving the official an opportunity to explain the failure.

Mandamus request

The court held that it had authority to consider the Minnesota-law mandamus request. It concluded that MSOP officials have a clearly established duty to carry out valid transfer orders within a reasonable time. The court also found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a specific public harm and that contempt proceedings or separate injunction actions would not be adequate alternative remedies.

But a peremptory writ requires the right to the requested action to be clear and the absence of any valid excuse to be apparent. The court decided that whether each plaintiff’s delay was unreasonable was fact-intensive and not yet clear. The MSOP therefore should have an opportunity to respond and explain the delays, including by addressing reasons it had cited such as funding, beds, and staffing. The court dismissed the renewed request for a peremptory writ without prejudice. It also noted that the writ request as applied to Gardner and Alexander was dismissed because they had since been transferred to CPS. The court directed the parties to meet and confer about what transfer time may be reasonable and what factors should be considered.

Individual-capacity damages claims

The plaintiffs brought their individual-capacity claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of constitutional rights by government officials. The defendants asserted qualified immunity, which can protect officials from damages when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs adequately alleged a constitutional violation: the law recognized a protected interest in timely implementation of their transfer orders, and the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that they were deprived of that interest without procedures. However, the court held that the law did not clearly establish what delay would be unreasonable enough to violate due process. Because the defendants could not reasonably have known that the alleged delays violated a clearly established right, the court held that they were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the individual-capacity damages claims. The court did not decide whether the complaint adequately alleged Harpstead’s personal involvement.

Official-capacity claims and order

Applying the law-of-the-case doctrine, which generally keeps earlier decisions governing later stages of the same case, the court maintained its prior rulings on the official-capacity claims. The court denied the motion to dismiss Count II against the defendants in their official capacities. It dismissed Counts III and IV against the defendants in their official capacities with prejudice, and dismissed Counts II, III, and IV against the defendants in their individual capacities with prejudice.

The order states that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Count I was dismissed without prejudice. The only claim allowed to proceed was the procedural due-process claim against the defendants in their official capacities.