Coleman-Bey v. Childrens Aid Society

Background

Bro Bashiri Coleman-Bey, representing himself, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute allowing claims for certain constitutional violations by people acting for the government. He sued the Children’s Aid Society (CAS), CAS Director Maria Burgos, CAS Supervisor Alexis Barber-Davis, CAS case manager Victoria Kalumbi, and Jessica Victoria-Silk, identified as an attorney for the New York City Administration for Children’s Services.

Coleman-Bey alleged that he signed a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) authorization for release of health information under threat, duress, and coercion. He alleged that Kalumbi discussed his urinalysis results with a doctor and put the conversation in a court report and his CAS and ACS file. He further alleged that one or more defendants gave unlawful findings to a judge, negatively affecting him, his wife, and four babies. He also alleged discrimination and another barrier to reunification with his tribe. He invoked the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Amendments, HIPAA, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the rights of children. He requested $5 million in damages, terminations, sanctions, and criminal charges.

Screening standard

Because Coleman-Bey was allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees, the court was required to screen the complaint. It explained that it must dismiss an action or part of an action that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, seeks money from an immune defendant, or falls outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also explained that self-represented pleadings are read liberally, but they must still provide enough factual detail to make a claim plausible and must satisfy the requirement for a short and plain statement of the facts supporting relief.

Court’s analysis

Criminal charges. The court held that private citizens cannot prosecute criminal charges in a civil lawsuit. Allegations seeking to impose criminal liability on defendants therefore had to be dismissed.

Children’s Aid Society and its employees. A § 1983 claim requires facts showing that the defendant acted under color of state law, meaning through authority or conduct fairly attributable to the government. The court described CAS as a private, nonprofit organization. It explained that a private organization may sometimes be treated as a government actor if the government coerced or controlled it, jointly participated in its conduct, or delegated a public function to it. The complaint did not provide enough facts about CAS’s interactions with Coleman-Bey, including the context in which CAS asked him to sign the urinalysis authorization or what government-related functions CAS was performing. The court therefore found that Coleman-Bey failed to state a § 1983 claim against CAS, Burgos, Barber-Davis, and Kalumbi.

ACS attorney. A § 1983 claim also requires facts showing each defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. The complaint did not allege what Silk did or failed to do. The court therefore found that the allegations against her failed to state a claim. The court also noted that, depending on the function Silk performed, she might have absolute immunity from suit. It stated that repleading claims based on functions similar to those of a prosecutor would be futile.

HIPAA. The court explained that HIPAA generally protects individually identifiable health information and allows certain disclosures, including disclosures made in response to a court order. It noted that the Second Circuit has questioned whether HIPAA creates a private right to sue and that district courts in the circuit have held that individuals cannot sue under HIPAA or seek damages for such disclosures. The court found Coleman-Bey’s allegations insufficient to show a HIPAA violation and stated that HIPAA would not provide a private cause of action even if he could allege one.

Fourth Amendment. The court recognized that drug testing is a search under the Fourth Amendment. It explained that reasonableness depends on balancing the privacy intrusion against legitimate government interests, and that a court order can serve as the equivalent of a warrant in a family-law setting. Consent can also justify a search, but consent must be freely and voluntarily given.

Coleman-Bey alleged that his consent to urinalysis testing was involuntary. The court found those allegations insufficient because the complaint suggested that a Family Court may have ordered the testing and that there may have been individualized grounds for it. The court did not determine that the testing was lawful on the merits; it found that the complaint did not allege enough facts to state a Fourth Amendment claim.

Federal-court limitations. The court stated that, depending on the context and requested relief, some of Coleman-Bey’s claims might not be appropriate for federal court. Federal courts cannot issue child-custody decrees. They may also have to refrain from deciding claims involving an ongoing Family Court proceeding, and federal district courts generally cannot review state-court judgments as appellate courts. Because the complaint provided few facts, the court could not determine whether any claim could proceed in federal court.

Disposition

The court granted Coleman-Bey leave to amend rather than immediately ending the action. The amended complaint had to identify the relevant people and their titles, describe what each defendant did or failed to do, provide dates and locations, explain how the conduct violated his rights and caused injury, and specify the requested relief. The amended complaint would replace the original complaint rather than supplement it, so any claims Coleman-Bey wished to pursue had to be included again.

The amended complaint had to be filed with the court’s Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days, labeled “Amended Complaint,” and include docket number 19-CV-7911 (CM). No summons would issue at that time. The court warned that if Coleman-Bey failed to amend within the allowed period without showing good cause, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied payment-free status for purposes of an appeal.