Northover v. United States
- Kenneth Karas
- 7:16-cv-06086
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 12
In Northover v. United States, Judge Karas dismissed Anthony Northover’s sentence challenge as waived and independently rejected his Johnson argument on the merits.
Anthony Northover’s federal sentence challenge was dismissed as waived and independently rejected on the merits; the United States prevailed.
What happened
In Northover v. United States, Anthony Northover, representing himself, sought to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argued that Johnson v. United States made the violence-related sentencing treatment in his case unconstitutional.
The court held that Northover had knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to challenge any sentence within the agreed Guidelines range. His 157-month sentence fell within that range, so the waiver covered his claim. The court also concluded that the waiver did not prevent an independent merits ruling because Johnson did not apply to his sentencing calculations or convictions.
Judge Karas dismissed the petition as waived and independently denied it on the merits. The court also declined to issue a certificate allowing an appeal and directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the United States and close the case.
The detailed version
- Northover v. United States · No. 7:16-cv-06086
- Kenneth Karas
- Nov. 19, 2019
Background
Anthony Northover, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asking the court to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. His underlying criminal case involved convictions for racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack, and possessing firearms during and in relation to drug-trafficking and racketeering offenses.
Northover had pleaded guilty under a written agreement. The agreement waived his rights to appeal or bring a collateral challenge under § 2255 or § 2241 to any sentence within or below a stipulated Guidelines range of 157 to 181 months. During the plea hearing, the court discussed the waiver with him and confirmed that he understood the charges, possible sentences, and consequences of pleading guilty. The court later imposed 97 months on two counts and 60 consecutive months on the firearm count, for a total sentence of 157 months.
Northover’s Claim
Northover argued that he had not received a downward departure because of violence in his criminal history and that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), had found the relevant violence language vague and unconstitutional.
Waiver Ruling
The court first ruled that the plea agreement’s waiver barred the petition. Sentence-appeal and collateral-attack waivers are generally enforceable when made knowingly, voluntarily, and competently. The court found that Northover’s waiver met that standard based on the agreement and the plea-hearing record. Northover’s 157-month sentence was within the stipulated range, and he did not claim that his waiver was uninformed or involuntary.
The court therefore dismissed the petition as waived. It explained that the recognized exceptions to such waivers did not apply. In particular, Northover did not challenge the advice that led to his guilty plea, identify an unconstitutional sentencing factor, allege that the government breached the plea agreement, or identify another stated basis for invalidating the waiver.
Independent Merits Ruling
The court also denied the petition independently on the merits. Johnson invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, which concerned conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury. Northover was not sentenced under that statute. Instead, his Guidelines calculation included a two-level enhancement because a victim sustained serious bodily injury, criminal-history points for prior state convictions, and additional points for committing the offenses while on probation.
The court held that the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. It also found that Northover was not sentenced under the Guidelines’ Career Offender provisions, including the provision that had mirrored the language invalidated in Johnson. The court concluded that his Guidelines range was calculated correctly.
The court further held that Johnson did not invalidate Northover’s firearm conviction. The court stated that the offense involved a drug-trafficking crime and a crime of violence under the force clause, including conspiracy to murder and attempted murder, rather than relying only on the invalidated risk-of-force language. The court also stated that Davis, which later invalidated the risk-of-force clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), did not affect Northover’s conviction. The other statutes underlying his convictions likewise did not contain similar language.
Finally, the court rejected any broader argument that Johnson created a new general rule against vague criminal statutes for purposes of § 2255’s filing deadline. It stated that the prohibition against vague criminal statutes was longstanding and that Northover had not identified another basis making his petition timely or authorized by statute.
Disposition
The court’s conclusion states that it dismissed Northover’s petition. It also declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Northover had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied. The court certified that an appeal from the judgment on the merits would not be taken in good faith, directed entry of judgment for the United States, and ordered the case closed.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.