Diaz v. United States

Background

Rayvon Diaz, appearing without a lawyer, pleaded guilty on September 11, 2012, to conspiring to distribute at least 28 grams of crack cocaine and to possessing a firearm during and in relation to that drug-trafficking offense. The firearm offense was under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). On July 17, 2013, the court imposed a 150-month prison sentence, below the agreed Guidelines range of 168 to 195 months.

Diaz’s plea agreement stated that he would not directly appeal or bring a collateral challenge—including a challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255—to a sentence within or below the agreed range. During the plea hearing, the court discussed the waiver and confirmed that Diaz understood it. The court also advised Diaz of the charges, their elements, and the mandatory minimum sentences.

Diaz later filed a petition under § 2255, a federal procedure for asking the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence. He argued that Johnson v. United States invalidated the legal basis for his firearm conviction and that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. He also sought equitable tolling of the filing deadline, but the court had previously denied that request.

Reasons for the Decision

Statute of limitations. The court held that the petition was time-barred. Section 2255 generally requires a petition to be filed within one year of the latest of several specified dates. Diaz’s conviction had become final more than one year before he filed his petition. The court also held that the one-year period for a claim based on Johnson ran from Johnson’s decision, not from the later decision holding Johnson retroactive, so the petition was untimely on that basis as well.

Waiver. The court separately held that Diaz’s challenge was covered by the waiver in his plea agreement. Because the court imposed a sentence below the stipulated range, the waiver applied. The court found that the plea hearing showed the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and Diaz did not challenge the process by which he agreed to it or identify another exception that could make it unenforceable.

Johnson claim. The court also rejected the claim on the merits. Johnson held that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of “violent felony” violated due process. Diaz was not convicted under that law. His firearm conviction was instead based on possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The court explained that Johnson did not address the definition of a drug-trafficking crime and therefore did not provide a basis for vacating Diaz’s conviction.

Guilty plea. The court rejected Diaz’s argument that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Diaz argued that he did not understand that the firearm charge required a firearm separate from the drug offense and that he was not told about the mandatory minimum penalties. The court found that the plea transcript showed that the government and the court explained the firearm charge’s elements, including possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. Diaz also confirmed under oath that he understood the charge and described possessing or having access to firearms for protection connected to the drug conspiracy.

The court further found that Diaz was expressly told that the drug conspiracy and firearm charges carried mandatory minimum sentences of five years each, with the firearm sentence running consecutively. Diaz repeatedly confirmed that he understood those penalties. The plea agreement also listed the mandatory minimums.

Disposition

The court dismissed the Petition. It did not issue a certificate of appealability because Diaz had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied. The court also certified that an appeal from the judgment on the merits would not be taken in good faith and directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the United States and close the case.