State of New York v. United States Department of Homeland Security

Background

New York, the City of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont challenged the federal government’s “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds” rule. The rule changed the definition of a “public charge” for immigration purposes and was scheduled to take effect on October 15, 2019.

The court had previously granted the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, which temporarily barred the defendants from implementing or enforcing the rule nationwide. The court also postponed the rule’s effective date while the case proceeded or until further court order. The defendants appealed that earlier order and then moved to stay, or pause, the preliminary injunction during the appeal.

The Stay Standard

The court applied four factors for deciding whether to grant a stay pending appeal: whether the moving party is likely to succeed, whether it will suffer irreparable harm without a stay, whether a stay would substantially injure other interested parties, and where the public interest lies. The court stated that a stay is discretionary and that the party seeking one bears a difficult burden.

The Parties’ Arguments

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were outside the group protected by the rule and lacked standing because their alleged injuries depended on speculative decisions by third parties. On the merits, the defendants argued that the rule implemented the immigration-law principle of self-sufficiency and was within the government’s authority. They also argued that the government and public would suffer financial, administrative, and practical harms if the injunction remained in place.

The defendants further asked the court, at minimum, to limit the injunction to the plaintiff states. The plaintiffs responded that they would suffer immediate and irreparable proprietary, economic, and program-related harms if the injunction were paused. They also argued that the rule would discourage immigrants from receiving benefits for which they were legally eligible and would increase health and economic instability.

Court’s Analysis

The court rejected the defendants’ arguments. It found that the defendants had not provided a reasonable explanation for defining a public charge as someone who receives one or more public benefits for more than 12 months within a 36-month period. The court stated that the term had never previously been interpreted that way, that no precedent supported the definition, and that there was no indication Congress intended to redefine the term in that manner.

The court also distinguished the new rule from the prior Field Guidance. According to the court, that guidance distinguished between cash assistance and long-term institutionalization, on one hand, and supplemental non-cash benefits, on the other. The court quoted the guidance as stating that participation in non-cash programs was not evidence of poverty or dependence.

The court found that the defendants had not adequately demonstrated what irreparable injuries the federal agencies would suffer without a stay or how those injuries outweighed the harms identified by the plaintiffs and the public. It stated that the injunction maintained the existing framework, which had been in place for decades, and that the defendants had not identified a rational justification or urgent need for changing that status quo during the appeal. The court also rejected the request to limit the nationwide scope of the injunction.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. This order addressed whether to pause the earlier injunction; it did not enter a final ruling on the underlying challenge to the public-charge rule.

Classification

This is a procedural order because the court ruled on an ancillary request to pause an injunction during an appeal, rather than finally deciding the underlying legal challenge to the rule.