Juca v. Carranza

Background

Jhoana Juca and Victor Arteaga, individually and as parents and natural guardians of K.A.; Donna Cornett and John Burgess, individually and as parents and natural guardians of Eileen Mendez; Eileen Mendez, individually and as parent and natural guardian of A.C.; Neysha Cruz, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Alexandra Vera-Fiallos; Alexandra Vera-Fiallos, individually and as parent and natural guardian of L.F.; and Shannon Thomason and Vinnie Penna, individually and as parents and natural guardians of E.P., sued Richard Carranza, in his official capacity as chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, and the Department.

The plaintiffs’ children had been classified as disabled under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The plaintiffs sought funding for private-school tuition and transportation services. On October 18, 2019, the court denied their request for a preliminary injunction, which is an order requiring action while a case continues.

The Department represented that it did not contest continued placement and services during the dispute for five students and that payment for those services had been made or would soon be made. For K.A., the Department disputed the continued placement, but the record showed that K.A. was receiving services in the placement chosen by the student without a risk that the services would stop or be interrupted.

Motion for Reconsideration

The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3. The court explained that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy generally available only when there has been a change in controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error or manifest injustice. It is not a way to repeat arguments already considered or obtain a second hearing on the same issues.

The plaintiffs raised two grounds. First, they argued that continued placement and services during the dispute operate as an automatic injunction and must be implemented immediately. They asserted that the Department’s alleged policy of requiring a hearing and an order before funding placements threatened the students’ rights, even though the students were in their preferred placements and the Department had made most or all of the payments at issue.

The court rejected this argument because it had already been raised in the preliminary-injunction motion and at oral argument. Repeating the same argument did not justify reconsideration.

Second, the plaintiffs argued that changed circumstances concerning K.A. warranted reconsideration, particularly because the Department had stopped contesting K.A.’s continued placement. The court found that this change occurred after the October 18 order, so it was not information the court had overlooked and was not newly discovered evidence that existed when the earlier decision was made. The court also found no showing that the change harmed K.A., that the Department would refuse to provide retroactive funding, or that K.A.’s services were threatened. Instead, the court stated that the matter appeared to be moving toward a favorable resolution for K.A.

Ruling

Judge Edgardo Ramos denied the application for reconsideration. The court also directed the clerk to terminate motions listed as Documents 4 and 14. The order did not alter the earlier denial of the preliminary injunction.