Reyes De Tavarez v. Huggler

Background

Emily Reyes de Tavarez visited Woodbourne Correctional Facility to see her husband. The facility had changed its practice for storing visitors’ cell phones, but Tavarez allegedly did not know about the change and entered with two inoperable cell phones in her handbag. Corrections officer Robert Huggler searched her, found the phones, detained her, and had her taken to a police facility. She was charged under New York law with introducing contraband into a prison. The charges were later dismissed for lack of evidence.

Tavarez sued Huggler under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law that allows claims against government officials for violating federal rights. She alleged false arrest, malicious prosecution, and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The complaint also referred at times to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits intentional racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts.

Legal standard

The court applied the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. At this stage, the court assumes the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations are true and asks whether they plausibly show a right to relief.

False arrest

The court held that probable cause justified the arrest. Probable cause means facts and reasonably trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable officer to believe a person committed or was committing a crime. The court concluded that Huggler had probable cause to believe Tavarez knowingly brought prohibited cell phones into the facility and intended to give at least one phone to an inmate. The court relied on the presence of two phones, Tavarez’s visit to her husband, and her statement that she did not know the phones were in her handbag. The fact that the phones were allegedly inoperable did not eliminate probable cause because an officer could not reliably determine that from their appearance. The court dismissed the false-arrest claim.

Malicious prosecution

The court held that the same probable cause also defeated the malicious-prosecution claim. Tavarez did not identify an intervening fact between her arrest and prosecution that would have eliminated probable cause. The court dismissed this claim as well.

Equal protection and related § 1981 claim

For an equal-protection claim, Tavarez had to allege that Huggler knowingly applied a different enforcement standard to similarly situated people. She identified three people who allegedly were allowed to leave the facility to store electronic devices without being arrested, but she did not allege that Huggler was involved in those incidents. The court therefore found that the complaint did not plausibly connect Huggler to different treatment and dismissed the equal-protection claim for failure to state a claim. To the extent the complaint asserted separate claims under § 1981, the court dismissed those claims under the same pleading analysis.

Disposition

The court granted Huggler’s motion to dismiss. The Clerk was directed to close the motion and the case. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.