Fowler v. The City of New York

Background

Jamarr Fowler brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law that allows claims against people who violate constitutional rights while acting under state authority. He represented himself. The complaint named the City of New York and five initially unidentified New York City Police Department officers. Defendants’ counsel later identified those officers as Detective Michael Fahy, Sergeant Gonzalo Corredor-Torres, Joseph Parchen, Detective Jason Wolfenhaut, and Detective Colin Higgins.

Fowler alleged that on February 11, 2015, the officers broke down the door of his home, illegally searched it, removed $3,000, held him down at gunpoint, called him derogatory and racist names, and arrested him for assault, menacing, and harassment. He was arraigned in New York state court and spent several days in jail before posting a $10,000 bond. The charges were dropped on May 5, 2016, after facts came to light showing that the officers had arrested the wrong person.

Fowler mailed the complaint to the Southern District of New York’s Pro Se Office. The postmark was May 14, 2019, and the office received and filed the complaint on May 21, 2019. The defendants moved to dismiss on September 3, 2019, arguing that all claims were time-barred and that the complaint did not adequately state a claim against the City under the rule established in Monell v. Department of Social Services. Fowler opposed the motion.

Ruling

The court granted the motion to dismiss. It held that the § 1983 claims against the officers were untimely and that the complaint failed to state a claim against the City. Because no viable federal claims remained, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims.

Timeliness of the Claims

The court held that § 1983 claims in New York generally must be filed within three years. For a self-represented plaintiff, the relevant filing date was when the Pro Se Office received the complaint—May 21, 2019—not the date Fowler said he mailed it. The court rejected Fowler’s argument that the complaint should be treated as filed on April 26, 2019. It explained that the prison-mailbox rule, which can treat a prisoner’s filing as made when delivered to prison officials for mailing, did not apply because Fowler was not filing as a prisoner. The court also found no basis for extending the deadline because the delay was within Fowler’s control.

The court concluded that any excessive-force claim had to be filed by February 11, 2018, three years after the alleged incident. It therefore held that the excessive-force claim was untimely. A false-arrest claim, also called false imprisonment, generally begins running when the alleged imprisonment ends and the person becomes held under legal process, such as after arraignment. The court found that Fowler was arraigned before May 5, 2016, so the false-arrest claim also was filed too late. A malicious-prosecution claim begins running when the criminal case conclusively ends. Because Fowler’s criminal case ended on May 5, 2016, the court held that this claim was untimely as well.

Claims Against the City

The court separately held that the complaint did not adequately plead municipal liability. Under § 1983, a city is not automatically liable for the actions of its employees. A complaint must plausibly allege that a city policy, an official decision, a widespread and established practice, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise caused the constitutional violation. The court found that Fowler’s complaint did not support any of those theories. It also held that the alleged treatment during this one incident, although described as grave and serious, was not enough by itself to establish an unlawful City policy or custom or a systematic failure to train.

Disposition

Judge Lorna G. Schofield granted the motion to dismiss. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and directed the Clerk of Court to close Docket No. 21 and mail Fowler a copy of the order. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.