Glascoe v. Solomon

Background

Deirdre C. Glascoe represented herself in an action against Joshua Solomon, Richard Cintron, Richard A. Carranza, and the New York City Department of Education. The opinion states that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York indicated it was the proper municipal party, although Glascoe had named the New York City Department of Education.

Glascoe alleged that she worked as a probationary substitute teacher and special education teacher at the Business of Sports School. She claimed that she experienced race, religion, and age discrimination; that her employment was terminated in retaliation for reporting wrongdoing and complaining to government officials; and that defendants violated federal, state, and local law. Her complaint also asserted claims on behalf of all descendants of African slaves and on behalf of God. The opinion lists claims under, among other authorities, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, federal civil-rights statutes, constitutional amendments, New York whistleblower laws, and state tort law.

Glascoe alleged that Solomon recommended ending her probationary service and that Cintron affirmed the decision, terminating her employment effective February 8, 2019. She also alleged that Solomon disciplined or threatened to discipline her after a dispute with a white teacher, that she was treated unfavorably because she wore a headscarf, that Solomon made an age-related comment, and that she was fired for reporting what she described as mistreatment and oppression at the school.

Procedural history

The court had previously dismissed Glascoe’s class claims because a self-represented plaintiff cannot represent other people. It also dismissed claims against three New York State officials as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and as frivolous. After Glascoe filed an amended complaint, Solomon, Cintron, Carranza, and the Department of Education moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.

Glascoe filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, but Magistrate Judge Barbara C. Moses stayed that motion as premature. Glascoe later moved to strike defendants’ dismissal motion and reply brief. The order addresses defendants’ dismissal motion and Glascoe’s two motions to strike.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the complaint was filled with fantastic and delusional scenarios and therefore had to be dismissed as frivolous. It cited Glascoe’s allegations that God was a party seeking to reclaim descendants of African slaves as his property, that she had been specially trained by God to interpret divine messages for the court, and that she used anagrams and other methods to support her allegations. The court stated that these allegations did not amount to factual allegations supporting legally recognized claims.

The court also found that allegations using legal terms were too conclusory. In particular, it found that Glascoe’s allegations that the United Federation of Teachers and the Department of Education conspired to terminate her were unsupported by specific facts. It reached a similar conclusion about allegations that Pearson PLC and its United States subsidiaries operated a racketeering organization controlling the education system. The court stated that the complaint did not contain facts raising a right to relief above the speculative level. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as frivolous was therefore granted.

The court separately considered Glascoe’s employment allegations. It held that her race and national-origin discrimination claims failed because she offered no supporting facts beyond identifying her race and stating that Solomon and the other teacher were white. The court also held that a threat of a negative rating or disciplinary action was not, without additional negative consequences, a materially adverse employment action.

The religious-discrimination claim also failed. The court held that alleged tension with a co-teacher, the co-teacher’s refusal to work with Glascoe, and an assignment to teach math rather than science did not amount to a materially adverse employment action. It further held that Glascoe did not allege facts supporting an inference that the conduct was motivated by religion.

The age-discrimination claim was based on Solomon’s statement that Glascoe was “old enough to know better.” The court held that Glascoe did not allege that a disciplinary notice was actually placed in her file or that she suffered another adverse employment action because of her age. The court also stated that an isolated remark, without more, was insufficient.

As to the termination, the court recognized that termination is an adverse employment action but held that Glascoe did not allege that she was fired because of her race, national origin, religion, or age. The court declined to rewrite the complaint to add those allegations.

The court dismissed Glascoe’s First Amendment retaliation claim because the communications she described were made through internal school channels about her working conditions and the treatment of students, which the court treated as speech made as part of her official duties. The court also dismissed her claim that defendants retaliated against her for filing this action or complaining to the state Department of Education. The court found no sufficient allegation that Solomon knew about the lawsuit when he called a disciplinary meeting and stated that the available information instead supported the inference that the meeting concerned Glascoe’s residence in Virginia during leave, allegedly contrary to a Department of Education regulation.

The court dismissed the state-law claims because Glascoe did not allege that she had filed the required notice of claim within ninety days, and the opinion states that no notice of claim was on file with the New York State Comptroller’s Office. The court also granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the class claims because a self-represented plaintiff may not represent other people.

Finally, the court denied Glascoe’s motions to strike. It explained that a dismissal motion and a reply brief are not pleadings covered by the federal rule governing motions to strike.

Disposition

Judge Analisa Torres granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, denied Glascoe’s motions to strike, dismissed the complaint in its entirety, and denied Glascoe leave to amend. The court directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the listed motions and close the case.