Fontaine v. The Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations

Background

Carolina Fontaine alleged that she was discriminated against, sexually harassed, and retaliated against while employed by the Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations. She asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also asserted a common-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Cristian Barros, Carlos Olguin, and Ernesto Gonzalez based on an anonymous letter sent to her later employer.

The defendants filed a suggestion of immunity and a motion to dismiss. They argued that the Permanent Mission was protected by sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and that the individual defendants were protected by diplomatic immunity. The opinion treated these arguments as challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning the court’s legal authority to hear the case.

Claims Against the Permanent Mission

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act generally protects a foreign state from the jurisdiction of United States courts unless an exception applies. Fontaine relied on the contract’s choice-of-law clause, which stated: “For all legal purposes, this contract shall be governed by the current legislation of the United States.”

The court concluded that this unqualified clause was strong evidence that the Permanent Mission intended to waive its sovereign immunity for disputes arising from the employment relationship. The court noted that the contract contained no disclaimer of waiver and did not limit the clause to contract claims. The court also considered a letter from the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that Fontaine’s contract was governed by United States law.

The court therefore denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Fontaine’s claims against the Permanent Mission.

Claims Against the Individual Defendants

The court held that Barros and Olguin were diplomatic envoys who had absolute immunity from civil process under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The court rejected Fontaine’s argument that an exception for professional or commercial activity applied, explaining that the alleged workplace harassment and retaliation involved workplace management rather than trade or business activity pursued for personal profit.

Gonzalez was not a diplomatic envoy, but he was a member of the Permanent Mission’s administrative staff. His immunity therefore did not extend to acts outside the course of his duties. The court concluded that Fontaine’s employment-discrimination allegations concerned acts performed in the course of Gonzalez’s duties and granted dismissal of those claims against him.

The court also held that Barros and Olguin were immune from the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. It held that Gonzalez was immune from that claim because the letter discussed Fontaine’s performance as an employee and its effect on the Permanent Mission, placing the letter within the scope of his duties regardless of whether sending it was appropriate or wrongful.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the employment-discrimination claims against the individual defendants and granted the motion to dismiss the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. It denied the motion to dismiss the claims against the Permanent Mission. Overall, the motion was granted in part and denied in part. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motion and correct the caption’s spelling on the docket.