Savoca v. United States
- Vincent Briccetti
- 7:16-cv-04465
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 17
In Savoca v. United States, Judge Briccetti denied the § 2255 motion and dismissed the petition, rejecting both ACCA and firearm-sentence challenges.
Lawrence Savoca’s federal sentence and collateral challenge were affected; the United States prevailed on the motion.
What happened
In Savoca v. United States, Lawrence Savoca sought to undo a 30-year sentence imposed after convictions for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, discharging a firearm during that offense, and possessing a firearm as a felon. His sentence included 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act based on three prior burglary convictions and 10 consecutive years for discharging the firearm.
Savoca argued that the 15-year enhancement was invalid under Johnson v. United States because it may have relied on the Armed Career Criminal Act’s unconstitutional residual clause. He also argued under Davis v. United States that attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not a qualifying violent crime for the firearm conviction.
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti denied the motion and dismissed the petition. He ruled that the record showed the sentencing court relied on the Act’s burglary provision, not its residual clause, so the Armed Career Criminal Act claim did not satisfy the rules for a second challenge. He also ruled that attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a violent crime under the statute’s force provision, although the court separately found that claim failed the same procedural requirements. The court issued a certificate allowing an appeal and granted permission to appeal without paying filing fees.
The detailed version
- Savoca v. United States · No. 7:16-cv-04465
- Vincent Briccetti
- May 5, 2020
Background
Lawrence Savoca moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. He had been convicted after trial of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and possessing a firearm as a felon.
The sentencing court imposed a total 30-year prison term. It imposed concurrent five-year terms on the conspiracy and attempted-robbery counts, a consecutive 10-year term on the firearm-discharge count, and a consecutive 15-year term on the felon-in-possession count. The 15-year term was imposed under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which requires that enhanced minimum sentence for certain felon-in-possession convictions when the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felonies.
The presentence report described three separate 1991 felony burglaries in which Savoca entered private residences and stole jewelry and cash. At sentencing, the government relied on those three residential burglary convictions to argue that the Armed Career Criminal Act applied. The opinion states that neither the sentencing court nor the parties discussed the Act’s force clause or residual clause. The sentencing court found that Savoca was subject to the 15-year Armed Career Criminal Act minimum.
Claims and applicable rules
Savoca’s motion was a second or successive § 2255 motion. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, such a motion must rely on a new constitutional rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court and previously unavailable. Although the Court of Appeals had authorized Savoca to file the motion, the district court was required to independently determine whether each claim satisfied those requirements.
Savoca’s first claim relied on Johnson v. United States, which held that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court later held that Johnson applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Johnson did not invalidate the Act’s force clause or its provision listing burglary as a qualifying offense.
Savoca’s second claim relied on United States v. Davis, which held that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague. He argued that attempted Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify under the statute’s force clause, which covers felonies involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person or property.
Rulings
Judge Vincent L. Briccetti dismissed the Armed Career Criminal Act claim because it did not satisfy the gatekeeping requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion. The court concluded that the sentencing record showed reliance on the Act’s enumerated-offenses clause, which expressly includes burglary, rather than the residual clause invalidated by Johnson. The opinion emphasized that the residual clause was never mentioned or discussed at sentencing. It rejected Savoca’s argument that the government’s reference to burglary’s “potential for violence” invoked the residual clause. The court also rejected the argument that later statutory-interpretation decisions could be combined with Johnson to satisfy the successive-motion requirements.
The court likewise dismissed the § 924(c) claim for failure to satisfy those gatekeeping requirements. It explained that Savoca was attempting to combine a statutory interpretation argument about the force clause with Davis’s constitutional rule about the residual clause. The court held that the gatekeeping requirement could not be avoided in that way.
The court then addressed the merits of the § 924(c) claim in the alternative. Applying the categorical approach, which examines the elements of the offense rather than the particular facts, the court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause. The court reasoned that Hobbs Act robbery requires taking or obtaining property through actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of injury, and that an attempt requires a substantial step toward completing the offense together with intent to complete it. It therefore concluded that attempted Hobbs Act robbery necessarily involves the attempted use of physical force.
Disposition
The court denied Savoca’s § 2255 motion and dismissed the petition. It issued a certificate of appealability because reasonable judges could disagree about at least some unsettled issues, and it granted permission to appeal without prepaying filing fees. The Clerk was instructed to close case number 16 CV 4465.
Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.