Johnson v. City of New York

Background

Vandyke Johnson, representing himself, brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of constitutional rights by state or local officials. He sought damages from the City of New York; New York Police Department Officers Randazzo and Hotoniel Diaz; two unidentified officers; Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) employee Diana Alma; ACS Commissioner David A. Hansell; the New York City Department of Education; Principal Rachael Garcia; and Parent Coordinator Wandaly Torres.

Johnson’s claims arose from three arrests and related events. On August 22, 2019, Officers Randazzo and Diaz arrested him on charges including endangering the welfare of a child, third-degree assault, and harassment after officers observed or were told about scratches, redness, and other injuries to a child. Johnson denied abusing his children and accused the officers of fabricating evidence. The criminal charges from that arrest were later dismissed on November 25, 2019, although the opinion does not state the grounds for that dismissal.

On November 25, 2019, ACS worker Alma and Officer John Doe #1 went to Johnson’s residence with an ex parte temporary restraining order. Johnson alleged that he had not been served with the order and showed the officer paperwork stating that the earlier criminal charges had been dismissed. He was nevertheless arrested for violating the restraining order. On February 12, 2020, school officials Garcia and Torres called the police when Johnson was outside his child’s school while his cousin was inside to pick up the child. Officer John Doe #2 arrested Johnson for allegedly violating an order of protection. The opinion states that the criminal proceedings from that incident were pending when Johnson filed the complaint, although the complaint anticipated dismissal.

Johnson also alleged that Alma filed a child-neglect petition containing false information and that she was liable for abuse of process, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. He claimed Hansell was responsible for Alma’s conduct because he supervised ACS. Johnson further alleged that the City, the Department of Education, and ACS had policies or practices that caused the claimed violations.

Screening standard

Because Johnson had been allowed to proceed without prepaying filing fees, the court was required to screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court explained that it had to dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a legally sufficient claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. It also had to dismiss a case over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Although courts read self-represented complaints generously, the complaint still had to provide enough factual detail to make the claims plausible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.

False arrest

The court held that Johnson had not stated a false-arrest claim for any of the three arrests. For the August 22 arrest, the allegations showed that the officers had probable cause—facts that would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe a crime had been committed—because they observed injuries and received information that Johnson had dragged the child from a bedroom. The officers were not required to resolve Johnson’s competing explanation before making the arrest.

For the November 25 arrest, the court held that dismissal of the earlier criminal charges did not automatically invalidate the separate restraining order. Johnson alleged that the order was still outstanding and did not allege that the Family Court had changed or canceled it. The court also stated that the officer was not required to decide at the scene whether Johnson had been properly served with the order.

For the February 12 arrest, the court held that the information provided by the school officials gave Officer John Doe #2 probable cause to believe Johnson was violating the order of protection. Johnson’s unspecified court order and explanation that Alma had failed to tell the school about his cousin’s permission did not eliminate probable cause. The court reached the same result for Garcia and Torres because Johnson did not allege that they knowingly made a false report or lacked a reasonable basis for calling the police.

Malicious prosecution

The court held that Johnson had not stated a malicious-prosecution claim. Such a claim required, among other things, a criminal proceeding that ended in a way affirmatively indicating the plaintiff’s innocence. The November 25 charges were dismissed on speedy-trial grounds, which did not indicate innocence. The August 22 charges were dismissed after an unspecified motion was granted, and Johnson did not provide the grounds for that ruling. The February 12 proceedings were still pending. The court therefore found that none of the three incidents supported a malicious-prosecution claim.

Fabrication of evidence

The court held that Johnson had not adequately alleged that Randazzo or Diaz fabricated evidence. Disagreeing with the officers’ account of the child’s injuries, or arguing that the injuries had another cause, did not by itself show that the officers fabricated their statements or photographs. Johnson did not allege facts plausibly showing that the officers manufactured the bruises or the photographs.

Claims concerning ACS

The court dismissed Johnson’s abuse-of-process claim against Alma for failure to state a claim. An abuse-of-process claim requires allegations that the defendant used legal process to obtain a collateral objective outside the legitimate purpose of that process. Johnson did not allege that Alma pursued the neglect proceedings for such an outside objective. The court also explained that Alma’s statement that an emergency-room visit was not necessary did not undermine the neglect petition, because a neglect finding does not require injuries needing urgent medical treatment.

The court found that Johnson had not alleged Hansell’s personal involvement in the events. A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because an employee allegedly violated someone’s rights. The court therefore found that the claims against Hansell in his personal capacity failed. It stated, however, that Johnson’s official-capacity claims against Hansell could proceed against the City because ACS is a City agency and naming both the agency official in an official capacity and the City is redundant.

Municipal liability

The court found that Johnson had not stated a claim against the City of New York. A municipality is not liable under § 1983 merely because one of its employees allegedly committed wrongdoing. Johnson had to allege a City policy, custom, or practice that caused the constitutional violation. He did not identify a particular City policy or practice causing the three arrests.

The court also found that Johnson’s allegations about the Department of Education did not plausibly show a policy authorizing teachers to make false statements to police. At most, the allegations showed that Alma did not tell Torres that Johnson’s cousin had permission to pick up the child. The court likewise found that Johnson’s allegations about an ACS policy allowing fabrication, false arrest, or malicious prosecution were insufficient because they described, at most, a single incident and did not identify a qualifying municipal policy or custom.

Disposition

The court granted Johnson leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days. The amended complaint had to replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint and include the relevant facts, each defendant’s conduct, dates and locations, the alleged rights violations, injuries, requested relief, and addresses for the defendants. The court directed that no summons issue at that time. It stated that if Johnson failed to file an amended complaint within the allowed period and could not show good cause, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Judge Louis L. Stanton signed the order.