Dash v. Mayers

Background

Raymon A. Dash, who was representing himself, sued C.O. John Doe and Debra Mayers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The claims arose from events at the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island on December 16, 2018.

Dash alleged that he requested psychiatric treatment because he was having suicidal thoughts and engaging in self-harm. He claimed that Mayers questioned him about his symptoms, mental-health history, bipolar-disorder diagnosis, and possible sexual abuse within hearing distance of other inmates, correctional officers, and staff. He also alleged that Mayers placed him under one-to-one supervision and that Doe failed to respond when Dash banged his head against a wall, cut his wrist with his toenail, and cried for help.

Mayers moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. Magistrate Judge James L. Cott recommended granting Mayers’s motion and dismissing the claim against Doe on the court’s own initiative. No party objected to the report and recommendation.

Court’s analysis

The court reviewed the report for clear error and adopted it in full.

Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim against Mayers. The court held that Dash did not adequately plead a constitutional privacy claim based on Mayers’s discussion of his symptoms and mental-health history. It explained that a prisoner’s medical-information privacy right is limited and generally covers unusual conditions whose disclosure is likely to cause intense concerns about confidentiality, hostility, or intolerance. The court agreed that bipolar disorder likely did not meet that standard. It also held that, even if the information were protected, Mayers’s questions and discussion served a legitimate prison-related purpose: gathering information needed to provide Dash with appropriate psychiatric care. The Fourteenth Amendment claim against Mayers was dismissed.

HIPAA claim against Mayers. The court held that an individual cannot sue under HIPAA to enforce the statute or recover damages for alleged disclosures. Dash’s HIPAA claim against Mayers was dismissed.

Compensatory damages and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act bars a prisoner from recovering compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. The court agreed that Dash had not alleged that Mayers caused physical injury. It noted that Dash attributed his wrist scarring and head pain to Doe’s conduct, not Mayers’s. The statute therefore barred compensatory damages from Mayers for the alleged injuries. The opinion also explained that the absence of physical injury does not by itself bar nominal or punitive damages when a constitutional violation has been established, but found no constitutional violation here.

Eighth Amendment claim against Doe. The court treated Dash’s allegations as an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It held that Dash’s uncertain allegation that Doe might have been pretending to sleep was not enough to plausibly show the required deliberate indifference. The court therefore dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim against Doe on its own initiative.

ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. The court held that Dash had not alleged that either defendant’s conduct was motivated by disability discrimination. It dismissed any claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

Qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a protection that generally shields government officials from damages claims unless they violated a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established. The court held that both defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Dash’s § 1983 claims. As to Mayers, the court found no clearly established privacy right covering the mental-health information at issue, particularly because she acted for a legitimate prison-related purpose. As to Doe, the court relied on precedent suggesting that the required mental state for deliberate indifference may not be present when the alleged conduct involves an official falling asleep.

Potential state-law claims. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, over any state-law claims that might have been alleged. It explained that federal claims had been eliminated early in the litigation.

Disposition

Judge George B. Daniels adopted Magistrate Judge Cott’s report and recommendation. The court granted Mayers’s motion to dismiss the claims against her. It also dismissed the additional claim against Doe on its own initiative. The court stated that Dash’s claims were dismissed with prejudice and directed the clerk to close the motion and mail Dash a copy of the decision and order.