Greens at Chester, LLC v. Town of Chester
- Philip Halpern
- 7:19-cv-06770
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 6
In Greens at Chester LLC v. Town of Chester, Judge Halpern granted the defendants’ dismissal motions in part and denied them in part.
Greens at Chester LLC may continue pursuing the claims not dismissed. The defendants obtained dismissal of the § 1981 claim, the separate good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim, and all claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities; the individual-capacity claims remained pending.
What happened
Greens at Chester LLC v. Town of Chester concerns claims by Greens at Chester LLC against the Town of Chester, Orange County, and several current or former officials. The plaintiff sought damages and permanent injunctive relief based on alleged constitutional, civil-rights, housing, contract, takings, and conspiracy violations. The defendants asked the court to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim.
The court found the claims ripe for review because the complaint plausibly alleged that further applications or appeals would have been futile. It dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the separate claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and all claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities. The claims against those individuals in their personal capacities were not dismissed.
Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied them in part. The defendants had to answer the amended complaint within fourteen days, and the court directed the Clerk to terminate the motions.
The detailed version
- Greens at Chester, LLC v. Town of Chester · No. 7:19-cv-06770
- Philip Halpern
- May 8, 2020
Background
Greens at Chester LLC sued the Town of Chester; James M. Farr, Robert Valentine, and Alexander J. Jamieson; Orange County; and Steven M. Neuhaus. The amended complaint sought damages and permanent injunctive relief and asserted twelve claims: substantive due process and equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982; Fair Housing Act claims; a Fifth Amendment takings claim; declaratory-judgment claims; breach-of-contract claims; and a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
The Town Defendants and County Defendants separately moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.
Ripeness and jurisdiction
The defendants argued that the land-use claims were not ready for federal-court review because the plaintiff had not obtained a final determination from a local land-use body or sought a variance. The plaintiff argued that there was no zoning dispute, that it had all required discretionary approvals, and that it neither needed nor sought a variance.
The court declined to resolve the factual question of whether the dispute was a zoning dispute or whether the plaintiff could have sought a variance at the pleading stage. Instead, it held that the allegations plausibly showed that the defendants had made clear that further applications would be denied. The court therefore found the claims ripe for review. The Town Defendants also challenged traceability and redressability, but the court found no merit in that argument.
Claims dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)
The court found that the amended complaint stated plausible claims for relief, with three exceptions.
First, the court dismissed the third claim, brought under § 1981, because § 1981 does not provide a private right of action against state actors. The court explained that § 1983 provides the exclusive federal remedy for violations of rights guaranteed by § 1981 by state governmental units.
Second, the court dismissed the eleventh claim, which separately alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Under the court’s explanation, that covenant is part of every contract, so the separate claim duplicated the breach-of-contract claim and was treated as included within it.
Third, the court dismissed all claims against Farr, Valentine, Jamieson, and Neuhaus in their official capacities because those claims duplicated claims against the Town and County. The court did not dismiss the claims against those defendants in their individual capacities. It stated that the allegations did not permit a decision at that stage on whether legislative immunity or qualified immunity applied; the individual defendants could raise that issue after discovery.
Disposition
Judge Philip M. Halpern’s order granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied them in part. The plaintiff’s third and eleventh claims were dismissed, as were all claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. The remaining claims were not dismissed by this order. The defendants were directed to answer the amended complaint within fourteen days, and the Clerk was instructed to terminate the two dismissal motions.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.