Lopez v. United States

Background

A grand jury charged Gibran Lopez and three co-conspirators with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, using and carrying firearms during that conspiracy, and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine. Lopez pleaded guilty to Count Two, the firearm count, and was sentenced to 60 months in prison.

The firearm conviction relied on the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy in Count One as the predicate offense. Lopez later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal procedure that allows a prisoner to seek relief from an unlawful conviction or sentence. He argued that the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Lopez was also separately convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy offenses in another case and received a 40-year sentence there. The opinion states that the Second Circuit upheld that conviction and sentence on appeal and that the Supreme Court later denied Lopez’s petition for review.

Legal analysis

The court had previously delayed consideration of Lopez’s § 2255 motion while the Second Circuit considered whether Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy qualified as a crime of violence. The Second Circuit initially held that it did in a prior related proceeding.

The Supreme Court later held in United States v. Davis that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s “risk-of-force clause” was unconstitutionally vague. That clause asked whether an offense involved a substantial risk that physical force might be used. Davis also held that courts must use a categorical approach—looking at the ordinary version of the offense rather than the defendant’s particular conduct—and rejected a method that relied on case-specific facts.

The court concluded that Davis displaced the Second Circuit’s earlier reasoning. Because the risk-of-force clause was unconstitutional and unenforceable, the court held that Lopez’s § 924(c) conviction under Count Two had to be vacated.

Ruling and effect

The United States agreed that Lopez’s conviction should be vacated and that his 60-month sentence should be set aside. The government stated that no further action was needed at that time because Lopez was still serving the separate 40-year sentence. Lopez agreed.

Chief District Judge Colleen McMahon ordered that Lopez’s conviction and sentence on Count Two be vacated and that the case be dismissed. The opinion also states that the government had agreed to dismiss Counts One and Three in exchange for Lopez’s guilty plea to Count Two and apparently did not intend to pursue those counts, but the order specifically states the disposition as vacating Count Two’s conviction and sentence and dismissing the case.