Lyons v. State of New York, Division of Police

Background

Seamus Lyons and Noel Nelson sued the State of New York, Division of Police, and Joseph D’Amico. Nelson, who is African-American, had worked for the New York State Police for more than 27 years. Lyons, who is Caucasian, had worked there for approximately 12 years.

The dispute arose from missing drug evidence and a missing laptop connected to police investigations. Nelson and Lyons gave statements during internal investigations about transporting drug evidence to a police barracks. The State Police later concluded that the plaintiffs had lied in their compelled statements and began disciplinary proceedings against them. Nelson was reassigned to administrative duties, was not authorized to handle evidence or take new cases, and claimed that his duties and overtime were reduced. Lyons faced disciplinary charges, and after D’Amico decided to impose termination instead of the lesser penalty recommended by a hearing board, Lyons resigned when given ten minutes to choose between resignation and termination.

Nelson also complained internally and to the New York State Division of Human Rights that he had been treated differently because of his race. Lyons supported Nelson’s discrimination complaint and gave a witness statement to the state agency.

Claims and Summary-Judgment Standard

Nelson asserted race-discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Both plaintiffs asserted retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against D’Amico. Because the Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for Section 1981 violations by state governmental actors, the court treated those claims as claims under Section 1983. Lyons also asserted a First Amendment retaliation claim under Section 1983 based on protected speech.

The defendants asked for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court viewed reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.

Title VII Claims

The court dismissed Nelson’s Title VII race-discrimination claim. It found that Nelson raised enough evidence at the initial stage to create a possible inference of discrimination: a jury could view Investigators Campos and Bennett as comparable employees who seriously mishandled evidence and made inconsistent or false statements but were treated more favorably. The defendants, however, provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for Nelson’s reduced duties: he was under investigation, had admitted to falsifying a business record involving the missing laptop, and had many cases to close.

The court then concluded that Nelson had not provided sufficient evidence that this explanation was a pretext for racial discrimination. His assertion that he was singled out was conclusory and was not supported by evidence showing that racial bias motivated the changes in his duties. The court therefore granted summary judgment against the race-discrimination claim.

The court also dismissed Nelson’s Title VII retaliation claim. The challenged placement on administrative duty occurred on September 30, 2011, before Nelson filed his internal discrimination complaint on October 12, 2011, and before his later complaints to the New York State Division of Human Rights. Because the challenged action came before the protected activity, the court found no required causal connection.

Section 1981 Retaliation Claims

The plaintiffs claimed that D’Amico retaliated against them by ordering a second investigation into the missing drug evidence and by bringing disciplinary charges that led to Nelson’s resignation and Lyons’s resignation in response to the threatened termination. The court treated these claims as Section 1983 claims because Section 1981 does not provide a separate private damages action against state actors.

The court denied summary judgment on these claims. It found genuine disputes about whether the second investigation was an adverse action, whether D’Amico knew about Nelson’s protected discrimination complaint and Lyons’s support for it, and whether a retaliatory motive caused the investigation. The unusual nature of the second investigation, its timing near Nelson’s complaint, and uncertainty about D’Amico’s motives supported sending the issue to a jury.

The court likewise found factual disputes about the disciplinary charges. It recognized that bringing disciplinary charges that could lead to suspension or termination can be an adverse employment action, and that the plaintiffs characterized their departures as forced resignations. The court identified circumstantial evidence that could cause a jury to question D’Amico’s claim that he was unaware of the discrimination complaints, including his unusual decision to replace the hearing board’s lesser recommended penalty for Lyons with termination.

First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Lyons alleged that D’Amico retaliated against him for protected speech. The opinion states that the court assumed, for purposes of the motion, that Lyons engaged in protected speech and, based on the factual disputes discussed above, denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim. The provided opinion text ends during this discussion, so it does not show the full reasoning for that claim.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Nelson’s Title VII claims were dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiffs’ Section 1981 retaliation claims and Lyons’s First Amendment retaliation claim remained. The clerk was directed to terminate the summary-judgment motion, and the court scheduled a pretrial conference for July 30, 2020.