McNichol v. Falco

Background

Richard McNichol, John Cocuzza, Jacquelin Millien, Greg Esposito, Stefan Tchor, Larry Lans, and Melissa Seminara sued the County of Rockland, Sheriff Lou Falco, and Chief Anthony Volpe under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law allowing claims against state or local officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants sought to end their employment and pursued disciplinary or criminal action against them because of their support for Richard Vasquez in the 2015 sheriff’s election, their union activity, or their perceived political views. They also alleged selective enforcement or prosecution in violation of equal-protection principles and asserted an abuse-of-process claim.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party on a material factual issue. In deciding the motion, the court had to view disputed evidence and reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.

Settlement Releases and Duress

Cocuzza, Seminara, Esposito, and Tchor had resigned and signed agreements containing broad releases of claims. The defendants argued that these agreements barred the four plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs argued that they had signed under duress, including threats of criminal prosecution.

The court held that genuine factual disputes prevented summary judgment on the release defenses as to Seminara, Esposito, and Tchor. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that they were told they would face criminal charges if they did not resign, that felony complaints had been prepared, and that they received the agreements only when they were presented for signature. The court also found factual questions about whether they promptly rejected the releases by bringing this lawsuit and whether retaining settlement benefits supported a finding that they had accepted the agreements.

The court reached a different conclusion for Cocuzza. It held that he could not maintain his claims as a matter of law. Unlike the other three plaintiffs, Cocuzza had already been criminally charged when he signed his settlement and release, and the criminal charges were reduced after he resigned. The court also relied on his sworn testimony in a workers’ compensation proceeding that he resigned because of injury and was not forced out. The court rejected his claim of financial pressure as insufficient, by itself, to establish unlawful economic duress.

First Amendment Retaliation

The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants took adverse employment actions because of protected speech or association. The court explained that a retaliation claim requires evidence of protected activity, an adverse action, and a connection between the two. The defendants could still prevail by proving that they would have taken the same action even without the protected activity.

The court found factual disputes concerning whether the defendants knew Lans opposed Sheriff Falco and supported Vasquez. It also found that Esposito could proceed based on evidence that defendants may have perceived him as a supporter of Sheriff Falco and used him as a scapegoat to make the alleged retaliation appear less focused on Vasquez supporters.

The court identified evidence from which a jury could infer retaliatory motivation, including the timing of disciplinary actions after Falco’s reelection, Falco’s alleged statement that the plaintiffs would see what would happen after he won, an email concerning Cocuzza, and evidence that officials did not initially pursue similar misconduct by officers who supported Falco. The court held that factual disputes also prevented applying the defense that the defendants would have taken the same actions for legitimate reasons even without the plaintiffs’ political activity.

Equal Protection and Abuse of Process

The court denied summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ equal-protection claims to the extent those claims depended on the alleged First Amendment retaliation. Because the court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claims of McNichol, Millien, Seminara, Esposito, Lans, and Tchor, it also denied summary judgment on their related equal-protection claims.

The court also denied summary judgment on any abuse-of-process claim. It held that a reasonable juror could find that the defendants drafted or filed criminal complaints, or threatened criminal prosecution, for an improper purpose even if probable cause existed.

Sheriff Falco’s Personal Involvement

The defendants argued that Sheriff Falco was entitled to summary judgment because he was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. The court rejected that argument. It cited evidence that Falco approved disciplinary charges or felony complaints, knew in advance about disciplinary charges against McNichol, asked that video footage be reviewed for possible criminal charges as to some plaintiffs, and expressed hostility toward the union and its Vasquez-supporting members. The court held that factual disputes prevented summary judgment for Falco on this ground.

Disposition

Judge Vincent L. Briccetti granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. John Cocuzza’s claims were dismissed. All other claims were to proceed, and the court directed counsel to appear for a telephone status conference concerning, among other matters, a possible trial date, pretrial submissions, and settlement efforts.