Cole- Hatchard v. Hoehmann

Background

Stephen Cole-Hatchard, a law-enforcement officer with the Clarkstown Police Department for more than thirty years, served as director of the Strategic Intelligence Unit, a joint task force created by the police department and the Rockland County District Attorney’s Office. He also communicated with members of the press, including Steven Lieberman of The Journal News, using his police-department email account.

In March 2016, Cole-Hatchard exchanged eleven emails with Lieberman. Two emails concerned a police incident involving Rodney Picott. The other emails concerned matters including Michael Garvey’s lawsuit against the Town, a possible settlement, a Town Board vote, a planned efficiency study, and campaign contributions and their alleged effect on Town matters. The defendants claimed that the Picott emails suggested a security breach involving confidential information. Cole-Hatchard claimed that his communications with Lieberman concerned protected speech and association, including speech about possible public corruption.

After the emails were discovered, the Town Board met on June 28, 2016. On July 1, Supervisor George Hoehmann directed the police chief, after consultation with other Town Board members, to reassign Cole-Hatchard from the Strategic Intelligence Unit to duties at police headquarters and to prevent him from having press or media contact. Cole-Hatchard was reassigned to the Juvenile Aid Bureau. His salary and rank remained the same, but he testified that he lost supervisory responsibilities, his police vehicle, overtime opportunities, and his prior office arrangement.

An internal investigation later exonerated Cole-Hatchard from the allegation that he had discussed confidential information with a member of the media. The report concluded that the Picott incident had not yet become an internal-affairs matter when the March 28 emails were sent and that it was highly unlikely Cole-Hatchard had confidential information to reveal at that time. Later, the Town sent information about Cole-Hatchard to the United States Attorney’s Office and asserted counterclaims against him in another officer’s lawsuit. After being placed on administrative leave following an incident involving his work computer, Cole-Hatchard resigned.

Claims and summary-judgment standard

Cole-Hatchard brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows claims against state or local officials for violating federal rights. He alleged retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights to speak and associate, a related equal-protection violation, and constructive discharge—the claim that an employer made working conditions so intolerable that an employee was forced to resign.

The court explained that summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about an important fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. At this stage, the court does not decide disputed facts or determine witness credibility. Instead, it views the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

First Amendment retaliation

The court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claims. To prevail on those claims, Cole-Hatchard would need to show that his speech or conduct was constitutionally protected, that the defendants took an adverse action against him, and that the protected activity caused the adverse action.

The court held that the record could support a finding that Cole-Hatchard spoke as a private citizen rather than as part of his official duties. The emails did not purport to address Strategic Intelligence Unit matters or information he obtained through that position. The court also concluded that the communications could concern matters of public concern, including possible public corruption and news about a police incident. The court noted that the meaning of the two Picott emails was disputed and that Cole-Hatchard testified he did not discuss the Picott incident during a later telephone call with Lieberman. Whether that testimony was credible was for a jury, not the court, to decide.

The court also found that a reasonable juror could view the reassignment as an adverse employment action even though Cole-Hatchard’s salary and rank did not change. The reassignment removed him as director of a county-wide intelligence task force and, according to his testimony, left him without supervisory or management responsibilities.

The court further found factual disputes about causation. The evidence included the timing of the investigation and reassignment, the Town’s email-search records, and searches for terms related to Garvey, Lieberman, the newspaper website, the Strategic Intelligence Unit, and Astorino. The court concluded that a reasonable juror could infer that Cole-Hatchard’s non-Picott communications with Lieberman, including communications about the Garvey lawsuit, a Town Board vote, an efficiency study, and campaign donations, were a substantial motivating factor in the reassignment.

Qualified immunity and the Pickering defense

The court denied the defendants’ qualified-immunity argument. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from liability when their conduct did not violate clearly established law or when it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct was lawful. The court held that it was clearly established that retaliating against a public employee for protected speech violated the Constitution, and factual disputes prevented a determination at this stage that the defendants reasonably acted lawfully.

The court also denied summary judgment based on the Pickering defense. That defense may protect an employment action when the employer reasonably predicts disruption from the employee’s speech, the disruption outweighs the speech’s value, and the action was taken because of anticipated disruption rather than retaliation. The court found factual disputes about whether the defendants acted because of potential disruption or because of Cole-Hatchard’s protected activity.

Constructive discharge

The court denied summary judgment on the constructive-discharge claim. Although Cole-Hatchard resigned after being placed on administrative leave for removing and deleting information from his work computer, the court held that a reasonable juror could find that he resigned because of a series of allegedly retaliatory actions. Those actions included the reassignment, Hoehmann’s letter to the United States Attorney’s Office, and the Town’s counterclaim against Cole-Hatchard.

Equal protection

The court denied summary judgment on the equal-protection claim. The court explained that when an equal-protection claim is based on an alleged First Amendment violation, the two claims are dependent on each other. Because the court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claims, it also denied summary judgment on the equal-protection claim.

Personal involvement

The court rejected the argument that Councilmen Frank Borelli and John J. Noto and Councilwoman Adrienne D. Carey were entitled to summary judgment because they did not personally participate in the alleged adverse actions. The record showed disputes about when and how the defendants learned of Cole-Hatchard’s communications and what information formed the basis for the actions against him. The evidence also showed that Borelli, Noto, and Carey were consulted about the reassignment, that Hoehmann’s letter to the United States Attorney’s Office stated it had the Town Board’s unanimous support, and that the counterclaim was submitted on behalf of the Town Board and its individual members.

Disposition

Judge Vincent L. Briccetti denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion, and the parties were directed to appear for a telephone status conference to discuss matters including trial and pretrial scheduling and possible settlement.