Ward v. Griffin
- Vincent Briccetti
- 7:19-cv-04759
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 14
In Ward v. Griffin, Judge Briccetti granted defendants’ dismissal motion because the amended complaint did not plausibly state constitutional claims.
Carlos Ward’s federal claims against Thomas Griffin, Albert Acrish, and Frederick N. Bernstein were dismissed. Any state-law claims were left without a federal court ruling because the court declined supplemental jurisdiction.
What happened
In Ward v. Griffin, Carlos Ward, representing himself, sued prison officials under a federal civil-rights law, claiming unsafe showers and inadequate medical care after a fall at Green Haven Correctional Facility. He alleged that raised shower platforms lacked handrails, causing falls, and that medical staff declined to order requested magnetic-resonance imaging.
The defendants argued that Ward had not plausibly alleged that Superintendent Thomas Griffin was personally involved in unconstitutional shower conditions, or that Nurse Practitioner Albert Acrish and Medical Director Frederick N. Bernstein were deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs. Ward also asserted that his injuries and treatment supported his claims.
Judge Briccetti granted the motion to dismiss, dismissed the federal claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims, and found that another amendment would be futile. The court closed the case and denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees.
The detailed version
- Ward v. Griffin · No. 7:19-cv-04759
- Vincent Briccetti
- June 29, 2020
Background
Carlos Ward, proceeding without a lawyer and without prepaying filing fees, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning his confinement and medical treatment at Green Haven Correctional Facility. He sued Thomas Griffin, identified as an Assistant Commissioner and former Superintendent; Frederick N. Bernstein, identified as the Medical Director; and Albert Acrish, identified as a Nurse Practitioner.
Ward alleged that he had continuing difficulty walking after reconstructive knee surgery in 2011. He further alleged that showers in Green Haven’s E Block had ten-inch raised platforms without handrails. He said he slipped twice while stepping down from the platforms and fell on July 5, 2016, injuring his left knee, hand, and shoulder.
Ward alleged that he was evaluated at the clinic and received X-rays after the fall. He claimed Acrish declined to order magnetic-resonance imaging of his knee and shoulder, recommended physical therapy for his knee, and provided ibuprofen for his shoulder. He alleged that Bernstein ignored his requests and complaints. Ward later received an MRI after an undescribed injury in April 2018, which showed several tears, but he stated that it was unclear how much the 2016 fall and medical care contributed to those injuries.
Ward also alleged that he filed a grievance about the showers. The Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee recommended making them accessible to accommodate inmates’ needs. Griffin denied Ward’s appeal through an unidentified officer, and the Central Office Review Committee upheld that denial.
Motion-to-dismiss standard
The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in Ward’s favor. Because Ward was proceeding without a lawyer, the court read his submissions liberally, including allegations first raised in his opposition to the motion, but it did not supply factual allegations that he had not made.
Conditions-of-confinement claim against Griffin
The court held that Ward did not plausibly allege Griffin’s personal involvement in unconstitutional shower conditions. Submitting a complaint or grievance to a supervisor, without personally investigating or acting on it, was insufficient. Griffin’s supervisory position also could not alone support liability under § 1983, because liability could not rest solely on the supervisor’s responsibility for subordinates.
The court added that, even if Ward had adequately alleged personal involvement, he had not plausibly alleged the required mental state. The absence of safety railings might create a sufficiently serious safety risk, especially for disabled inmates. But Ward alleged at most that Griffin should have foreseen a dangerous condition, not that Griffin actually perceived and consciously disregarded a substantial risk to Ward’s safety. The court therefore dismissed the Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim against Griffin.
Medical-care claim against Acrish
The court held that Ward did not plausibly allege that Acrish was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Ward alleged that he was evaluated, received X-rays and medication, and participated in physical therapy. The court also treated Acrish’s refusal to order the requested MRIs as a disagreement over the proper course of treatment, which did not by itself establish deliberate indifference. The court noted that the amended complaint alleged no pain or requests for additional treatment between July 2016 and the April 2018 injury. It dismissed the medical-care claim against Acrish.
Medical-care claim against Bernstein
The court held that Ward did not plausibly allege Bernstein’s personal involvement. Ward did not plausibly allege that Bernstein personally examined him or directly participated in his care. The allegation that Bernstein, as Acrish’s supervisor and Green Haven’s medical director, “ignored” Ward’s request and complaints was conclusory and insufficient. The court dismissed the medical-care claim against Bernstein.
Other issues and disposition
The court did not reach the defendants’ qualified-immunity argument because Ward failed to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against any defendant.
After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over any state-law claims that could be construed from the amended complaint.
Ward had already amended his complaint once, and his amended complaint and opposition did not cure the defects identified earlier. The court found that the problems were substantive and that better pleading would not cure them, so amendment would be futile. The motion to dismiss was granted, the clerk was instructed to terminate the motion and close the case, and the court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Ward permission to appeal without prepaying filing fees.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.