Miller v. Superintendent of the Shawangunk Correctional Facility

Background

Devon Miller, proceeding without a lawyer, petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for federal habeas relief from New York convictions for first-degree murder and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder conviction and a concurrent fifteen-year prison term plus five years of post-release supervision for the weapon conviction.

Miller challenged the admission of five written statements and one videotaped statement that he gave during questioning at a police precinct. He argued that the first three statements were obtained during questioning that amounted to custody without the required Miranda warnings. He also argued that the later statements were tainted because the warnings came only after the earlier questioning. In addition, he claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s handling of potential witnesses, expert testimony, his right to testify, statements by co-defendant Carlos Cruz, and the presence of counsel during questioning about the murder. He separately claimed that appellate counsel should have argued that jury selection began before the suppression hearing ended.

Miranda Claims

The court applied the deferential federal standard under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Under that standard, federal habeas relief is available only if the state court’s decision contradicted or unreasonably applied clearly established United States Supreme Court law, or rested on an unreasonable factual determination.

The court held that the state court reasonably concluded that Miller was not in custody when he gave his first three written statements. Miller went to the precinct voluntarily, drove himself, was not handcuffed or formally arrested, was allowed to use the bathroom without an escort, and was not told that he could not leave. The court acknowledged that he remained at the precinct for many hours and that the questioning became more accusatory, but concluded those facts did not make the state court’s decision unreasonable under federal law. The court also stated that the detectives’ undisclosed belief that Miller was a suspect did not determine whether he was in custody.

The court further held that the state court reasonably concluded that Miller’s two later written statements and videotaped statement were admissible. Miller received Miranda warnings twice and expressly waived his rights. The court found no evidence that his waivers were coerced or uninformed. It also concluded that the record did not establish a deliberate “question first, warn later” interrogation strategy of the type addressed in Missouri v. Seibert. The court therefore denied habeas relief on the Miranda claims.

Ineffective-Assistance Claims

The court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington: a petitioner must show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency likely affected the result. Because this was federal review of state-court decisions, the court applied the additional deference required by the federal habeas statute.

The court held that three trial-counsel claims were procedurally barred. The state court had rejected claims concerning failure to obtain a false-confession expert, refusal to allow Miller to testify, and introduction of Cruz’s statements because those issues were apparent from the trial record but had not been raised on direct appeal. The federal court treated New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10(2)(c) as an independent and adequate state procedural bar and found that Miller had not shown an applicable exception.

The court reviewed the merits of Miller’s claims that trial counsel failed to interview or call his parents and failed to investigate whether Miller’s lawyer should have been present during the precinct questioning. It concluded that the state court reasonably rejected the parents claim because their proposed testimony would have been cumulative, counsel could reasonably have viewed them as lacking credibility, and Miller had not shown prejudice. The court also concluded that the claim concerning counsel’s presence during questioning lacked merit because the questioning concerned an unrelated murder investigation rather than Miller’s pending trespass case, and counsel would not be ineffective for failing to raise a futile argument.

The court also rejected Miller’s ineffective-assistance claim against appellate counsel. Appellate counsel had filed an extensive brief and raised two other issues. The court concluded that counsel was not required to raise every possible argument and that the omitted argument about beginning jury selection before the suppression ruling was weak and could not establish prejudice.

Disposition

Judge Ronnie Abrams denied Miller’s habeas petition. The court affirmed the state court’s conclusions that Miller’s statements were properly admitted and that his trial and appellate counsel were not constitutionally ineffective. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the case and mail a copy of the opinion to Miller.