Piligian v. Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai

Background

George J. Piligian, a board-certified physician, sued the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai over federal and state disability discrimination and retaliation. Piligian alleged that he had Convergence Insufficiency, an eye disorder that caused nausea, vertigo, and vomiting when he looked at a computer screen. He alleged that his workload and data-entry responsibilities increased after the Selikoff Center merged with the World Trade Center Monitoring Program.

Piligian alleged that he requested paper data-entry forms, an administrative assistant to transcribe the forms, and other accommodations. He claimed that the School did not respond adequately to those requests and that he struggled to meet productivity standards and deadlines. The School later gave him notice that he would not be reappointed after his current term ended.

Piligian asserted eight claims: disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act; disability discrimination and retaliation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; disability discrimination and retaliation under the New York State Human Rights Law; and disability discrimination and retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law.

Summary-judgment standard

The School moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is a decision before trial that is proper only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about an important fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. At this stage, the court may not weigh competing evidence or decide which witnesses are credible; those functions belong to a jury.

The district court reviewed the parties’ objections to Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron’s report and recommendation. It reviewed the specifically challenged portions anew and reviewed the remaining portions for clear error.

Disability-discrimination claims

The School argued that the decisionmakers did not know about Piligian’s eye condition, that Piligian received every accommodation he requested, and that his non-reappointment resulted from legitimate performance problems. The court rejected those arguments at the summary-judgment stage.

The court found conflicting evidence about whether Piligian received the requested accommodations. Some testimony and documents supported the School’s position that Piligian received paper forms and assistance. But an email from Lucchini stated that data entry was Piligian’s duty “with no help from patient coordinator” and that, if he could not do it, “there is no other job and he can leave.” The court concluded that a reasonable factfinder could interpret the evidence as showing that the School refused to provide at least some accommodations.

The court also found a genuine factual dispute about the connections among the alleged failure to accommodate, Piligian’s performance deficiencies, and his non-reappointment. The record indicated that low productivity and failure to meet data-entry and form deadlines played a substantial role in the non-reappointment decision, while other evidence could support Piligian’s position that accommodations might have helped him meet those requirements.

Federal retaliation claims

The School argued that there was no causal connection between Piligian’s accommodation request and the non-reappointment decision. The court disagreed. It held that the short period—described as only a few days—between the request and the non-reappointment notice, combined with the Lucchini email chain, was enough to create a factual dispute about retaliatory intent.

The School also argued that the non-reappointment decision had been set in motion before Piligian requested accommodations because he had received earlier criticism and poor performance reviews. The court held that the earlier evidence did not establish, as a matter of law, that a disciplinary process leading to termination was already underway. It also held that Magistrate Judge Aaron properly considered a positive performance appraisal as one factor that could undermine the claimed continuing course of discipline. Summary judgment therefore remained denied on the federal retaliation claims.

New York City retaliation claim

The court granted summary judgment on Piligian’s New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claim. The relevant amendment to that law, effective November 11, 2019, expressly made a reasonable-accommodation request protected activity. The court held that the amendment did not apply retroactively to Piligian’s earlier conduct because it contained no retroactivity provision and did not clearly indicate that it should apply to past conduct.

The court also followed New York Appellate Division decisions stating that, before the amendment, merely requesting an accommodation did not qualify as protected activity for a New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claim. Because Piligian alleged retaliation based only on his accommodation request, the court concluded that this claim could not survive summary judgment.

New York State retaliation claim

The court also granted summary judgment on Piligian’s New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim. As described in the report and recommendation, a request for an accommodation alone was not protected activity under that law; retaliation for complaining about denial of an accommodation could qualify, but Piligian alleged only retaliation for making the request.

Disposition

Judge Carter adopted Magistrate Judge Aaron’s report and recommendation in full. The court denied summary judgment on counts one, two, three, four, five, and seven: the ADA discrimination and retaliation claims, the Rehabilitation Act discrimination and retaliation claims, the New York State disability-discrimination claim, and the New York City disability-discrimination claim. The court granted summary judgment on counts six and eight: the New York State and New York City retaliation claims. The parties were ordered to submit a joint status report by October 9, 2020.